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**US economic engagement with Mexico is a vehicle for neoliberal exploitation for the entire region – the plan becomes a tool for military intervention and US security interests while strengthening its economic grip over Latin America**

**Jacobs, 04** – Assistant Prof of Polisci at West Virginia University (Jamie Elizabeth, "Neoliberalism and Neopanamericanism: The View from Latin America," Latin American Politics & Society 46.4 (2004) 149-152, MUSE)//VP

The advance of neoliberalism suffers no shortage of critics, both from its supporters who seek a greater balance in the interests of North and South, and from its opponents who see it as lacking any real choice for developing states. The spread of neoliberalism is viewed by its strongest critics as part of the continuing expression of Western power through the mechanisms of globalization, often directly linked to the hegemonic power of the United States. Gary Prevost and Carlos Oliva Campos have assembled a collection of articles that pushes this debate in a somewhat new direction. This compilation addresses the question from a different perspective, focusing not on the neoliberal process as globalization but on neoliberalism as the new guise of panamericanism, which emphasizes a distinctly political overtone in the discussion. The edited volume argues that neoliberalism reanimates a system of relations in the hemisphere that reinforces the most negative aspects of the last century's U.S.-dominated panamericanism. The assembled authors offer a critical view that places neoliberalism squarely in the realm of U.S. hegemonic exploitation of interamerican relations. This volume, furthermore, articulates a detailed vision of the potential failures of this approach in terms of culture, politics, security, and economics for both North and South. Oliva and Prevost present a view from Latin America that differs from that of other works that emphasize globalization as a general or global process. This volume focuses on the implementation of free market capitalism in the Americas as a continuation of the U.S. history of hegemonic control of the hemisphere. While Oliva and Prevost and the other authors featured in this volume point to the changes that have altered global relations since the end of the Cold War—among them an altered balance of power, shifting U.S. strategy, and evolving interamerican relations—they all view the U.S. foreign policy of neoliberalism and economic integration essentially as old wine in new bottles. As such, old enemies (communism) are replaced by new (drugs and terrorism), but the fear of Northern domination of and intervention in Latin America remains. Specifically, Oliva and Prevost identify the process through which "economics had taken center stage in interamerican affairs." They [End Page 149] suggest that the Washington Consensus—diminishing the state's role in the economy, privatizing to reduce public deficits, and shifting more fully to external markets—was instead a recipe for weakened governments susceptible to hemispheric domination by the United States (xi). The book is divided into two main sections that emphasize hemispheric and regional issues, respectively. The first section links more effectively to the overall theme of the volume in its chapters on interamerican relations, culture, governance, trade, and security. In the first of these chapters, Oliva traces the evolution of U.S. influence in Latin America and concludes that, like the Monroe Doctrine and Manifest Destiny in the past, the prospect of hemispheric economic integration will be marked by a dominant view privileging U.S. security, conceptualized in transnational, hemispheric terms, that is both asymmetrical and not truly integrated among all members. In this context, Oliva identifies the free trade area of the Americas (FTAA) as "an economic project suited to a hemispheric context that is politically favorable to the United States" (20). The chapters in this section are strongest when they focus on the political aspects of neoliberalism and the possible unintended negative consequences that could arise from the neoliberal program. Carlos Alzugaray Treto draws on the history of political philosophy, traced to Polanyi, identifying ways that social inequality has the potential to undermine the stable governance that is so crucial a part of the neoliberal plan. He goes on to point out how this potential for instability could also generate a new period of U.S. interventionism in Latin America. Treto also analyzes how the "liberal peace" could be undermined by the "right of humanitarian intervention" in the Americas if the NATO intervention in Yugoslavia served as a model for U.S. involvement in the hemisphere. Hector Luis Saint-Pierre raises the issue of "democratic neoauthoritarianism," responsible for "restricting citizenship to the exercise of voting, limiting its voice to electoral polls of public opinion, restraining human rights to consumer's rights, [and] shutting down spaces to the citizens' participation" (116). While these critiques are leveled from a structuralist viewpoint, they often highlight concerns expressed from other theoretical perspectives and subfields (such as the literature on citizenship and participation in the context of economic integration). These chapters also emphasize the way inattention to economic, social, and political crisis could damage attempts at integration and the overall success of the neoliberal paradigm in the Americas. In general, the section on hemispheric issues offers a suspicious view of the U.S. role in promoting integration, arguing that in reality, integration offers a deepening of historical asymmetries of power, the potential to create new justifications for hegemonic intervention, and the further weakening of state sovereignty in the South. [End Page 150] If the first section of the book is joined with skepticism of integration as panamericanism and chooses to focus broadly on the negative effects of the implementation of these policies, part 2 links these regional issues with the politics of specific countries. This section offers articles that speak to country-specific issues in a regional context and to ways that bilateral relations with the United States shape the overall context of regional and hemispheric integration. The regional issues range from CARICOM's evolution to the different approaches to balancing human security and globalization in Central America, the special relationship of Mexico and the United States, and the disincentives for political parties to embrace the Mercosur process. Again, the authors offer continued pessimism about the process of integration unless Latin American states can exercise more control over its evolution. Key to this idea of alternative integration are Brazil and Mexico, the former more successful in asserting its independence than the latter, in the authors' view. Jaime Preciado Coronado singles out the geopolitics of U.S.-Mexican relations and their magnified effect in the region, where the United States has collaborated in Mexico's insertion into the world networks of interdependence and, in return, Mexico promotes the idea of the Washington Consensus intensely and its model of the promotion of free trade with the United States for the rest of Latin America, in order to achieve the consolidation of the continental bloc that maintains American hegemony through the use of the advantages of the international division of labor.

**Neoliberalism causes extinction**

**Darder, 10** – Professor Antonia Darder, Distinguished Professor of Education, University of Illinois, Urbana Champaign (“Preface” in *Critical Pedagogy, Ecoliteracy, & Planetary Crisis: The Ecopedagogy Movement* by Richard V. Kahn, 2010, pp. x-xiii)//VP

**GENDER MODIFIED**

It is fitting to begin my words about Richard Kahn’s Critical Pedagogy, Ecoliteracy, and Planetary Crisis: The Ecopedagogy Movement with a poem. The direct and succinct message of The Great Mother Wails cuts through our theorizing and opens us up to the very heart of the book’s message—to ignite a fire that speaks to **the ecological crisis** at hand; a crisis orchestrated by the inhumane greed and economic brutality of the wealthy. Nevertheless, as is clearly apparent, none of us is absolved from complicity with the devastating destruction of the earth. As members of the global community, we are all implicated in this destruction by the very manner in which we define ourselves, each other, and all living beings with whom we reside on the earth. Everywhere we look there are glaring signs of political systems and social structures that propel us toward **unsustainability and extinction**. In this historical moment, the planet faces some of the most horrendous forms of “[hu]man-made” devastation ever known to humankind. Cataclysmic “natural disasters” in the last decade have sung the environmental hymns of planetary imbalance and reckless environmental disregard. A striking feature of this ecological crisis, both locally and globally, is the **overwhelming concentration of wealth** held by the ruling elite and their agents of capital. This environmental malaise is characterized by the staggering loss of livelihood among working people everywhere; gross inequalities in educational opportunities; an absence of health care for millions; an unprecedented number of people living behind bars; and trillions spent on fabricated wars fundamentally tied to the control and domination of the planet’s resources. The Western ethos of mastery and supremacy over nature has accompanied, to our detriment, the unrelenting expansion of capitalism and its unparalleled domination over all aspects of human life. This hegemonic worldview has been unmercifully imparted through a host of public policies and practices that conveniently gloss over gross inequalities as commonsensical necessities for democracy to bloom. As a consequence, the liberal democratic rhetoric of “we are all created equal” hardly begins to touch the international pervasiveness of racism, patriarchy, technocracy, and economic piracy by the West, all which have fostered the erosion of civil rights and the unprecedented ecological exploitation of societies, creating conditions that now threaten our peril, if we do not reverse directions. Cataclysmic disasters, such as Hurricane Katrina, are unfortunate testimonies to the danger of ignoring the warnings of the natural world, especially when coupled with egregious governmental neglect of impoverished people. Equally disturbing, is the manner in which ecological crisis is vulgarly exploited by unscrupulous and ruthless capitalists who see no problem with turning a profit off the backs of ailing and mourning oppressed populations of every species—whether they be victims of weather disasters, catastrophic illnesses, industrial pollution, or inhumane practices of incarceration. Ultimately, these constitute ecological calamities that speak to the inhumanity and tyranny of material profiteering, at the expense of precious life. The arrogance and exploitation of neoliberal values of consumption dishonor the contemporary suffering of poor and marginalized populations around the globe. Neoliberalism denies or simply mocks (“Drill baby drill!”) the interrelationship and delicate balance that exists between all living beings, including the body earth. In its stead, values of individualism, competition, privatization, and the “free market” systematically debase the ancient ecological knowledge of indigenous populations, who have, implicitly or explicitly, rejected the fabricated ethos of “progress and democracy” propagated by the West. In its consuming frenzy to gobble up the natural resources of the planet for its own hyperbolic quest for material domination, the exploitative nature of capitalism and its burgeoning technocracy has dangerously deepened the structures of social exclusion, through the destruction of the very biodiversity that has been key to our global survival for millennia. Kahn insists that this devastation of all species and the planet must be fully recognized and soberly critiqued. But he does not stop there. Alongside, he rightly argues for political principles of engagement for the construction of a critical ecopedagogy and ecoliteracy that is founded on economic redistribution, cultural and linguistic democracy, indigenous sovereignty, universal human rights, and a fundamental respect for all life. As such, Kahn seeks to bring us all back to a formidable relationship with the earth, one that is unquestionably rooted in an integral order of knowledge, imbued with physical, emotional, intellectual, and spiritual wisdom. Within the context of such an ecologically grounded epistemology, Kahn uncompromisingly argues that our organic relationship with the earth is also intimately tied to our struggles for cultural self-determination, environmental sustainability, social and material justice, and global peace. Through a carefully framed analysis of past disasters and current ecological crisis, Kahn issues an urgent call for a critical ecopedagogy that makes central explicit articulations of the ways in which societies construct ideological, political, and cultural systems, based on social structures and practices that can serve to promote ecological sustainability and biodiversity or, conversely, lead us down a disastrous path of unsustainability and extinction. In making his case, Kahn provides a grounded examination of the manner in which consuming capitalism manifests its repressive force throughout the globe, disrupting the very ecological order of knowledge essential to the planet’s sustainability. He offers an understanding of critical ecopedagogy and ecoliteracy that inherently critiques the history of Western civilization and the anthropomorphic assumptions that sustain patriarchy and the subjugation of all subordinated living beings—assumptions that continue to inform traditional education discourses around the world. Kahn incisively demonstrates how a theory of multiple technoliteracies can be used to effectively critique the ecological corruption and destruction behind mainstream uses of technology and the media in the interest of the neoliberal marketplace. As such, his work points to the manner in which the sustainability rhetoric of mainstream environmentalism actually **camouflages** wretched neoliberal policies and practices that left unchecked **hasten the annihilation of the globe’s ecosystem**. True to its promise, the book cautions that any anti-hegemonic resistance movement that claims social justice, universal human rights, or global peace must contend forthrightly with the deteriorating ecological crisis at hand, as well as consider possible strategies and relationships that rupture the status quo and transform environmental conditions that threaten disaster. A failure to integrate ecological sustainability at the core of our political and pedagogical struggles for liberation, Kahn argues, is to blindly and misguidedly adhere to an anthropocentric worldview in which emancipatory dreams are deemed solely about human interests, without attention either to the health of the planet or to the well-being of all species with whom we walk the earth.

**The alternative is to reject the 1ac to interrogate neoliberal economic engagement with latin America from the starting point of knowledge production- that is a prerequisite to breaking down neoliberalism**

**Walsh, 12** – Estudios Culturales Latinoamericanos de la Universidad Andina Simón Bolívar (Catherine, “The Politics of Naming”, Cultural Studies, 26.1, Project Muse)//VP

Cultural Studies, in our project, is constructed and understood as more than a field of ‘study’. It is broadly understand as a formation, a field of possibility and expression. And it is constructed as a space of encounter between disciplines and intellectual, political and ethical projects that seek to combat what Alberto Moreiras called the impoverishment of thought driven by divisions (disciplinary, epistemological, geographic, etc.) and the socio-political-cultural fragmentation that increasingly makes social change and intervention appear to be divided forces (Moreiras 2001). As such, Cultural Studies is conceived as a place of plural-, inter-, transand in-disciplinary (or undisciplined) critical thinking that takes as major concern the intimate relationships between culture, knowledge, politics and economics mentioned earlier, and that sees the problems of the region as both local and global. It is a space from which to search for ways of thinking, knowing, comprehending, feeling and acting that permit us to intervene and influence: a field that makes possible convergence and articulation, particularly between efforts, practices, knowledge and projects that focus on more global justice, on differences (epistemic, ontological, existential, of gender, ethnicity, class, race, nation, among others) constructed as inequalities within the framework of neo-liberal capitalism. It is a place that seeks answers, encourages intervention and engenders projects and proposals. It is in this frame of understanding and practice in our Ph.D. programme in Latin-American Cultural Studies at the Universidad Andina Simo´n Bolı´var, that this broad description-definition continues to take on more concrete characteristics. Here I can identify three that stand out: the inter-cultural, the inter-epistemic and the de-colonial. The inter-cultural has been and still is a **central axis** in the **struggles** and processes of **social change** in the Andean region. Its critical meaning was first affirmed near the end of the 1980s in the Ecuadorian indigenous movement’s political project. Here inter-culturality was positioned as an ideological principal grounded in the urgent need for a radical transformation of social structures, institutions and relationships, not only for indigenous peoples but also for society as a whole. Since then, inter-culturality has marked a social, political, ethical project and process that is also epistemological;6 a project and a process that seek to re-found the bases of the nation and national culture, understood as homogenous and mono-cultural. Such call for re-founding does not to simply add diversity to what is already established, but rather to rethink, rebuild and inter-culturalize the nation and national culture, and with in the terrains of knowledge, politics and life-based visions. It is this understanding of the inter-cultural that is of interest. Concretely, we are interested in the spaces of agency, creation, innovation and encounter between and among different subjects, knowledges, practices and visions. Referring to our project of Cultural Studies as (inter)Cultural Studies, enables and encourages us to think from this region, from the struggles, practices and processes that question Eurocentric, colonial and imperial legacies, and work to transform and create radically different conditions for thinking, encountering, being and coexisting or co-living. In a similar fashion, the inter-epistemic focuses on the need to question, interrupt and transgress the Euro-USA-centric epistemological frameworks that dominate Latin-American universities and even some Cultural Studies programmes. To think with knowledges produced in Latin America and the Caribbean (as well as in other ‘Souths’, including those located in the North) and by intellectuals who come not only from academia, but also from other projects, communities and social movements are, for us, a **necessary and essential step**, both in **de-colonization** and in creating other conditions of knowledge and understanding. Our project, thus, concerns itself with the work of **inverting the geopolitics of knowledge**, with placing attention on the **historically subjugated** and negated plurality of knowledge, logics and rationalities, and with the political-intellectual effort to create relationships, articulations and convergences between them. The de-colonial element is intimately related to the two preceding points. Here our interest is, on one hand, to make evident the thoughts, practices and experiences that both in the past and in the present have endeavoured to challenge the colonial matrix of power and domination, and to exist in spite of it, in its exterior and interior. By colonial matrix, we refer to the hierarchical system of racial civilizational classification that has operated and operates at different levels of life, including social identities (the superiority of white, heterosexual males), ontological-existential contexts (the dehumanization of indigenous and black peoples), epistemic contexts (the positioning of Euro-centrism as the only perspective of knowledge, thereby disregarding other epistemic rationalities), and cosmological (the control and/or negation of the ancestral-spiritual-territorial-existential bases that govern the life-systems of ancestral peoples, most especially those of African Diaspora and of Abya Yala) (see Quijano 1999). At the centre or the heart of this matrix is capitalism as the only possible model of civilization; the imposed social classification, the idea of ‘humanity’, the perspective of knowledge and the prototype life-system that goes with it defines itself through this capitalistic civilizational lens. As Quijano argues, by defending the interests of social domination and the exploitation of work under the hegemony of capital, ‘the ‘‘racialization’’ and the ‘‘capitalization’’ of social relationships of these models of power, and the ‘‘eurocentralization’’ of its control, are in the very roots of our present problems of identity,’ in Latin America as countries, ‘nations’ and States (Quijano 2006). It is precisely because of this that we consider the de-colonial to be a fundamental perspective. Within our project, the de-colonial does not seek to establish a new paradigm or line of thought but a critically-conscious understanding of the past and present that opens up and suggests questions, perspectives and paths to explore. As such, and on the other hand, we are interested in stimulating methodologies and pedagogies that, in the words of Jacqui Alexander (2005), cross the fictitious boundaries of exclusion and marginalization to contribute to the configuration of new ways of being and knowing rooted not in alterity itself, but in the principles of relation, complement and commitment. It is also to encourage other ways of reading, investigating and researching, of seeing, knowing, feeling, hearing and being, that challenge the singular reasoning of western modernity, make tense our own disciplinary frameworks of ‘study’ and interpretation, and persuade a questioning from and with radically distinct rationalities, knowledge, practices and civilizational-life-systems. It is through these three pillars of the inter-cultural, the inter-epistemic and the de-colonial that we attempt to understand the processes, experiences and struggles that are occurring in Latin America and elsewhere. But it is also here that we endeavour to contribute to and learn from the complex relationships between culture-politics-economics, knowledge and power in the world today; to unlearn to relearn from and with perspectives otherwise. Practices, experiences and challenges In this last section, my interest is to share some of the particularities of our doctorate programme/project, now in its third cycle; its achievements and advancements; and the challenges that it faces in an academic context, increasingly characterized regionally and internationally, by disciplinarity, depolitization, de-subjectivation, apathy, competitive individualism and nonintervention. Without a doubt, one of the unique characteristics of the programme/ project is its students: all mid-career professionals mainly from the Andean region and from such diverse fields as the social sciences, humanities, the arts, philosophy, communication, education and law. The connection that the majority of the students have with social and cultural movements and/or processes, along with their dedication to teaching or similar work, helps to contribute to dynamic debate and discussion not always seen in academia and post-graduate programmes. Similarly, the faculty of the programme stand out for being internationally renowned intellectuals, and, the majority, for their commitment to struggles of social transformation, critical thinking and the project of the doctorate itself. The curriculum offering is based on courses and seminars that seek to foment thinking from Latin American and with its intellectuals in all of their diversity comprehend, confront and affect the problems and realities of the region, which are not only local but global. The pedagogical methodological perspective aforementioned works to stimulate processes of collective thought and allow the participants to think from related formations, experiences and research topics and to think with the differences disciplinary, geographical, epistemic and subjective thereby fracturing individualism by dialoguing, transgressing and inter-crossing boundaries. Trans-disciplinarity, as such, is a fundamental position and process in our project. The fact that the graduate students come from an array of different backgrounds provides a plurality in which the methodologicalpedagogical practice becomes the challenge of collectively thinking, crossing disciplinary backgrounds and creating new positions and perspectives, conceived and formed in a trans-disciplinary way. The majority of courses, seminars and professors, also assume that this is a necessary challenge in today’s world when no single discipline and no single intellectual is capable alone of analyzing, comprehending or transforming social reality. Nevertheless, trans-disciplinary gains continue to be a point of criticism and contention, especially given the present trend to re-discipline the LatinAmerican university. As Edgardo Lander has argued (2000a), this tendency reflects the neo-liberalization of higher education, as well as the increasing conservatism of intellectuals, including those that previously identified as or to continue to identify themselves as progressives and/or leftists. To establish oneself in a discipline or presume truth through a discipline, a common practice today, is to reinstall the geopolitics of knowing. This, in turn, strengthens Euro-USA-centrism as ‘the place’ of theory and knowledge. As such, the subject of dispute is not simply the trans-disciplinary aspect of Cultural Studies but also its ‘indisciplinary’ nature, that is, the effort central to our project to include points of view that come from Latin America and thinkers who are not always connected to academia (see Walsh et al. 2002). Our interest is not, as some claim, to facilitate the agendas or cultural agency of subaltern groups or social movements, promote activism or simply include other knowledge forms, but instead to build a different political-intellectual project a political-intellectual project otherwise. Such project gives centrality to the need to learn to think from, together and with Latin American reality and its actors, thereby stimulating convergences, articulations and inter-culturalizations that aim at creating an academia that is committed to life itself. Such a perspective does not eliminate or deny knowledge conceived in Europe or North America usually named as ‘universal’ or its proponents and thinkers. Instead, it incorporates such knowledge as part of a broader canon and worldview that seeks pluriversality, recognizing the importance of places and loci of enunciation. For our project, all of this serves to highlight the doubly complicated situation that is still in flux. On one hand, there is the negative association with trans-disciplinarity and the academic suppositions that accompany it, particularly in the area of research; this requires that our theses be doubly rigorous. And, on the other hand, there is the geopolitical limitation not only of disciplines but also of academic disciplining. To argue, as we do, that knowledge and thought are also produced outside of universities and, in dialogue with Hall, that political movements also produce and provoke theoretic moments and movements, is to question and challenge the academic logic and the authority of a universal and singular reasoning and science. We will, through such questioning and challenges, always be marginalized, placed on the fringe, under a microscope, criticized and disputed. Because of this, the challenges that we have encountered have been many. On one hand, there are those challenges that many face in the Latin-American academic context: the real difficulties of financing, infrastructure and research support. On the other hand, are the challenges that come with the traditional academic disciplinary structure, its de-politization and de-subjectification. Here the challenge is to transgress the established norms of neutrality, distance and objectivity. It is also to confront the standards that give little relevance to historically subjugated groups, practices and knowledges, and to the interlinking of race, ethnicity, gender and sexuality with the structures and models of power and knowledge. It is to make evident past and present struggles that give real meaning to the arguments of heterogeneity, decoloniality and inter-culturality. Here the criticism and dispute comes from many sides: from those who describe these efforts as too politicized (and, as such, supposedly less ‘academic’), uni-paradigmatic (supposedly limited to only one ‘line of thought’), fundamentalist (supposedly exclusionary of those subjects not marked by the colonial wound) and as obsessed with conflict (and therefore far from the tradition of ‘culture’, its letters and object of study). These challenges together with the tensions, criticisms and disputes that they mark often times make the path more difficult. Still, and at the same time, they allow us to clarify the distinctive and unique aspects of our project and its motivations to continue with its course of construction, insurgence and struggle. Our concern here is not so much with the institutionalizing of Cultural Studies. Better yet, and in a much broader fashion, we are concerned with epistemic inter-culturalization, with the de-colonialization and pluriversalization of the ‘university’, and with a thinking from the South(s). To place these concerns, as argued here, within a perspective and a politics of naming: ‘(inter)Cultural Studies in de-colonial code,’ is to open, not close, paths. Conclusion In concluding the reflections I have presented here, it is useful to return to a fundamental point touched by Stuart Hall: ‘intervention’. In particular and with Hall, I refer to the will to intervene in and transform the world, an intervention that does not simply relate to social and political contexts and fields, but also to epistemology and theory. That is to an intervention and transformation in and a de-colonization of the **frameworks and logics of our thinking**, knowing and comprehending. To commit oneself in mind, body and spirit as Frantz Fanon argued. To consider Cultural Studies today a project of political vocation and intervention is to position and at the same time build our work on the borders of and the boundaries between university and society. It is to seriously reflect on whom we read and with whom we want and/or need to dialogue and think, to understand the very limits or our knowledge. And precisely because of this, it is to act on our own situation, establishing contacts and exchanges of different kinds in a pedagogicalmethodological zeal to think from and think with, in what I have elsewhere called a critical inter-culturality and de-colonial pedagogy (Walsh 2009). In universities and societies that are increasingly characterized by nonintervention, auto-complacency, individualism and apathy, intervention represents, suggests and promotes a position and practice of involvement, action and complicity. To take on such a position and practice and to make it an integral part of our political-intellectual project is to find not only ethical meaning in work on culture and power, but also to give this work some heart. That is to say, to focus on the ever-greater need and urgency of life. To call these Cultural Studies or critical (inter)Cultural Studies is only one of our options, and part of the politics of naming.

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**Interpretation: Economic engagement has to include tangible incentives**

**Haass and O’Sullivan, 2k** - \*Vice President and Director of Foreign Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution AND \*\*a Fellow with the Foreign Policy Studies Program at the Brookings Institution (Richard and Meghan, “Terms of Engagement: Alternatives to Punitive Policies” Survival,, vol. 42, no. 2, Summer 2000, <http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/articles/2000/6/summer%20haass/2000survival.pdf>

Architects of engagement strategies can choose from a wide variety of incentives. Economic engagement might offer tangible incentives such as export credits, investment insurance or promotion, access to technology, loans and economic aid.3 Other equally useful economic incentives involve the removal of penalties such as trade embargoes, investment bans or high tariffs, which have impeded economic relations between the United States and the target country. Facilitated entry into the economic global arena and the institutions that govern it rank among the most potent incentives in today’s global market. Similarly, political engagement can involve the lure of diplomatic recognition, access to regional or international institutions, the scheduling of summits between leaders – or the termination of these benefits. Military engagement could involve the extension of international military educational training in order both to strengthen respect for civilian authority and human rights among a country’s armed forces and, more feasibly, to establish relationships between Americans and young foreign military officers. While these areas of engagement are likely to involve working with state institutions, cultural or civil-society engagement entails building people-to-people contacts. Funding nongovernmental organisations, facilitating the flow of remittances and promoting the exchange of students, tourists and other non-governmental people between countries are just some of the possible incentives used in the form of engagement.

**Violation: The plan is not tangible – it trades intangible information**

**That’s a voting issue:**

**1) Limits – intangible incentives explode the topic expanding the neg research burden to anything – even if does not exist**

**2) Ground – we can’t get trade links because they don’t actually send goods**

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#### The United States federal government should condition implementing bilateral automatic exchange of information with Mexico as it pertains to money laundering on ending human rights abuses by Mexican forces. The United States federal government should enact a periodic certification process to determine that abuses are effectively investigated and prosecuted.

#### Aid without human rights conditions send the message that US condones torture and violence – turns the aff and reinforces organized crime

**WOLA 10** – Washington Office on Latin America (“Congress: Withhold Funds for Mexico Tied to Human Rights Performance,” 9/14/2010, <http://www.wola.org/publications/congress_withhold_funds_for_mexico_tied_to_human_rights_performance>) //RGP

However, research conducted by our respective organizations, Mexico’s National Human Rights Commission, and even the State Department’s own reports, demonstrates conclusively that Mexico has failed to meet the four human rights requirements set out by law. As a result, Congress should not release these select Merida funds. Releasing these funds would send the message that the United States condones the grave human rights violations committed in Mexico, including torture, rape, killings, and enforced disappearances.¶ We recognize that Mexico is facing a severe public security crisis, and that the United States can play a constructive role in strengthening Mexico’s ability to confront organized crime in an effective manner. However, human rights violations committed by Mexican security forces are not only deplorable in their own right, but also significantly undermine the effectiveness of Mexico’s public security efforts. Building trust between the Mexican people and the government is essential to gathering information to dismantle organized crime. When security forces commit grave human rights violations and they are not held accountable for their actions, they lose that trust, alienating key allies and leaving civilians in a state of terror and defenselessness. It is thus in the interest of both of our countries to help Mexico curb systematic human rights violations, ensure that violations are effectively investigated and those responsible held accountable, and assess candidly the progress Mexico is making towards improving accountability and transparency. ¶ Evidence demonstrates that Mexico is not fulfilling effectively any of the requirements established by Congress, particularly those dealing with prosecuting military abuses and torture:

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#### Immigration reform will pass now

Leopold 10/24 David, Immigration Attorney/Immigration Reform Advocate, past president & past general counsel, American Immigration Lawyers Association, Huffington Post, Immigration Reform Is Alive and Kicking on Capitol Hill, 10/24/13, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/david-leopold/immigration-reform-is-alive\_b\_4136478.html

As it turns out, reports of the death of immigration reform were greatly exaggerated. Rep. Mario Diaz-Balart (R-Fla.), Rep. Darrell Issa (R-Calif.) and other House Republicans and Democrats are reportedly working on various immigration plans, some of which, including a bill to be released next week by Issa, deal with the toughest issue of all -- what to do about the nation's 11.7 million undocumented immigrants. And Speaker John Boehner (R-Ohio) says that immigration reform could get to the floor of the House before the end of the year.¶ Is common sense breaking out on Capitol Hill? That might be too much to ask for. But at least the GOP leadership seems to be taking a hard look at political reality.¶ Here are four big reasons why an immigration overhaul is likely to happen by the end of the year:¶ 1. Immigration reform is a political win-win for Democrats and Republicans.¶ I can't say that either the Democrats or Republicans came out of last week's shutdown and debt limit brinksmanship looking good to the American people, but the whole debacle hurt the Republicans much more. A recent NBCNews/Wall Street Journal poll found that the public blames the GOP more than President Obama by 53 percent to 31 percent, a 21 point margin. And approval ratings for the Republican party are at an all-time low -- never before in the history of polling have the numbers shown such blatant disappointment.¶ Immigration reform gives the Republicans a unique opportunity to do something big, to reach across the aisle and work with House Democrats to pass real immigration reform either in a comprehensive package or as a series of bills that ultimately have a chance to fix what's wrong with our immigration system. It would be a colossal mistake for the House GOP not to seize the chance to lead on immigration reform. The American people want it, the country needs it, and it's a pathway to political redemption for the badly bruised Republican party.¶ 2. The immigration reform coalition is unified and ready to make the final push.¶ A broad coalition of business, labor, faith-based and ethnic groups are full of energy and ready to finish the job the Senate started in the spring. In the midst of the combined "shutdown and debt ceiling" crisis, thousands of Americans descended on Washington to join the "March for Dignity and Respect." Eight members of Congress, including civil rights icon John Lewis (D-Ga.), joined together in an historic act of civil disobedience and were arrested near the steps of the Capitol in a show of solidarity with the immigration reform movement. As Rep. Charles Rangel (D-N.Y.) wrote recently in his The Huffington Post column "Why I Went To Jail":¶ Some may call it a publicity stunt. Some may call it a political theater. For whatever reason some may think I stood out there with thousands of clergy and advocates calling for immigration reform, the fact is that it got attention. And immigration reform is a critical issue that desperately needs it. If eight Members of Congress getting thrown in jail is what it takes to get people talking about it, then I'll gladly sit in the slammer. We cannot let ourselves forget that our nation has been built by immigrants, and the story of America began with people from another nation traveling to our shores.¶ Congress needs to fix the twisted morass of rules and regulations that pass for America's immigration policy. No longer can we sit idle as our mess of a "system" ruthlessly breaks up American families, stifles economic growth, and compromises our nation's democratic principles. Now is the time.¶ 3. The DREAMERs have become doers.¶ A funny thing happened since the DREAM Act was first introduced in 2001. The DREAMERs grew up. And they grew up as Americans, watching football, going to homecoming dances, eating hotdogs on the 4th of July and dreaming about giving back to the country they've struggled against all odds to enrich. They are no longer the helpless children who were brought to the U.S. by their parents. Today they are, in effect, undocumented Americans.¶ Through masterful use of 21st century tools like Facebook and Twitter, coupled with old-fashioned organizing and courage, the DREAMERs have become a key voice in the struggle for immigration reform. They, more than any other group, deserve the lion's share of credit for pushing the administration to grant an administrative deportation reprieve to qualified undocumented youth last year.¶ For DREAMERs there is no giving up on their journey toward U.S. citizenship. They will no longer take no for an answer.¶ 4. Now is the time.¶ The passion is there, the energy is there, and, most of all, the American people are there. It's time for both parties to sit down together and create an immigration process that will protect our borders, keep our families safe and together, give our businesses the tools they need to compete in the global economy, and provide a road map to lawful immigration status for the 11 million aspiring citizens currently living in the shadows.¶ Now, not later. Now.

#### The plan’s perceived as soft on Mexico – drains capital and specifically derails immigration

Shear ’13 (Michael. Politics for the New York Times. “In Latin America, US Shifts Focus from Drug War to Economy” 5/5/13 NYT)//VP

Last week, Mr. Obama returned to capitals in Latin America with a vastly different message. Relationships with countries racked by drug violence and organized crime should focus more on economic development and less on the endless battles against drug traffickers and organized crime capos that have left few clear victors. The countries, Mexico in particular, need to set their own course on security, with the United States playing more of a backing role. That approach runs the risk of being seen as kowtowing to governments more concerned about their public image than the underlying problems tarnishing it. Mexico, which is eager to play up its economic growth, has mounted an aggressive effort to play down its crime problems, going as far as to encourage the news media to avoid certain slang words in reports. “The problem will not just go away,” said Michael Shifter, president of the Inter-American Dialogue. “It needs to be tackled head-on, with a comprehensive strategy that includes but goes beyond stimulating economic growth and alleviating poverty. “Obama becomes vulnerable to the charge of downplaying the region’s overriding issue, and the chief obstacle to economic progress,” he added. “It is fine to change the narrative from security to economics as long as the reality on the ground reflects and fits with the new story line.” Administration officials insist that Mr. Obama remains cleareyed about the security challenges, but the new emphasis corresponds with a change in focus by the Mexican government. The new Mexican president, Enrique Peña Nieto, took office in December vowing to reduce the violence that exploded under the militarized approach to the drug war adopted by his predecessor, Felipe Calderón. That effort left about 60,000 Mexicans dead and appears not to have significantly damaged the drug-trafficking industry. In addition to a focus on reducing violence, which some critics have interpreted as taking a softer line on the drug gangs, Mr. Peña Nieto has also moved to reduce American involvement in law enforcement south of the border. With friction and mistrust between American and Mexican law enforcement agencies growing, Mr. Obama suggested that the United States would no longer seek to dominate the security agenda. “It is obviously up to the Mexican people to determine their security structures and how it engages with other nations, including the United States,” he said, standing next to Mr. Peña Nieto on Thursday in Mexico City. “But the main point I made to the president is that we support the Mexican government’s focus on reducing violence, and we look forward to continuing our good cooperation in any way that the Mexican government deems appropriate.” In some ways, conceding leadership of the drug fight to Mexico hews to a guiding principle of Mr. Obama’s foreign policy, in which American supremacy is played down, at least publicly, in favor of a multilateral approach. But that philosophy could collide with the concerns of lawmakers in Washington, who have expressed frustration with what they see as a lack of clarity in Mexico’s security plans. And security analysts say the entrenched corruption in Mexican law enforcement has long clouded the partnership with their American counterparts. Putting Mexico in the driver’s seat on security marks a shift in a balance of power that has always tipped to the United States and, analysts said, will carry political risk as Congress negotiates an immigration bill that is expected to include provisions for tighter border security. “If there is a perception in the U.S. Congress that security cooperation is weakening, that could play into the hands of those who oppose immigration reform,” said Vanda Felbab-Brown, a counternarcotics expert at the Brookings Institution in Washington. “Realistically, the border is as tight as could be and there have been few spillovers of the violence from Mexico into the U.S.,” she added, but perceptions count in Washington “and can be easily distorted.” “Drugs today are not very important to the U.S. public over all,” she added, “but they are important to committed drug warriors who are politically powerful.” Representative Michael T. McCaul, a Texas Republican who is chairman of the Homeland Security Committee, has warned against the danger of drug cartels forming alliances with terrorist groups. “While these threats exist, you would be surprised to find that the administration thinks its work here is done,” he wrote in an opinion article for Roll Call last month, pressing for more border controls in the bill. The Obama administration has said any evidence of such cooperation is very thin, but even without terrorist connections, drug gangs pose threats to peace and security. Human rights advocates said they feared the United States would ease pressure on Mexico to investigate disappearances and other abuses at the hands of the police and military, who have received substantial American support. The shift in approach “suggests that the Obama administration either doesn’t object to these abusive practices or is only willing to raise such concerns when it’s politically convenient,” said José Miguel Vivanco, director of Human Rights Watch’s Americas division. Still, administration officials have said there may have been an overemphasis on the bellicose language and high-profile hunts for cartel leaders while the real problem of lawlessness worsens. American antidrug aid is shifting more toward training police and shoring up judicial systems that have allowed criminals to kill with impunity in Mexico and Central America. United States officials said Mr. Obama remains well aware of the region’s problems with security, even as he is determined that they not overshadow the economic opportunities. It is clear Mr. Obama, whatever his words four years ago, now believes there has been too much security talk. In a speech to Mexican students on Friday, Mr. Obama urged people in the two countries to look beyond a one-dimensional focus on what he called real security concerns, saying it is “time for us to put the old mind-sets aside.” And he repeated the theme later in the day in Costa Rica, lamenting that when it comes to the United States and Central America, “so much of the focus ends up being on security.” “We also have to recognize that problems like narco-trafficking arise in part when a country is vulnerable because of poverty, because of institutions that are not working for the people, because young people don’t see a brighter future ahead,” Mr. Obama said in a news conference with Laura Chinchilla, the president of Costa Rica.

#### Capital is key – allows Obama to thread the needle – there’s momemtum now

McMorris-Santoro 10/15 Evan, BuzzFeed Staff, Obama Has Already Won The Shutdown Fight And He’s Coming For Immigration Next, 10/15/13, http://www.buzzfeed.com/evanmcsan/obama-has-already-won-the-shutdown-fight-and-hes-coming-for

As the fiscal fight roiling Washington nears its end, the White House is already signaling that it plans to use the political momentum it has gained during the shutdown fight to charge back into the immigration debate. And this time, Democratic pollsters and advocates say, they could actually win.¶ The final chapter of the current crisis hasn’t been written yet, but Democrats in Washington are privately confident that they’ll emerge with the upper hand over the conservatives in Congress who forced a government shutdown. And sources say the administration plans to use its victory to resurrect an issue that was always intended to be a top priority of Obama’s second-term agenda.¶ Advocates argue the post-fiscal crisis political reality could thaw debate on the issue in the House, which froze in earlier this year after the Senate passed a bipartisan immigration bill that was led by Republican Sen. Marco Rubio and Democratic Sen. Chuck Schumer.¶ “It’s at least possible with sinking poll numbers for the Republicans, with a [GOP] brand that is badly damaged as the party that can’t govern responsibly and is reckless that they’re going to say, ‘All right, what can we do that will be in our political interest and also do tough things?’” said Frank Sharry, executive director of the immigration reform group America’s Voice. “That’s where immigration could fill the bill.”¶ The White House and Democrats are “ready” to jump back into the immigration fray when the fiscal crises ends, Sharry said. And advocates are already drawing up their plans to put immigration back on the agenda — plans they’ll likely initiate the morning after a fiscal deal is struck.¶ “We’re talking about it. We want to be next up and we’re going to position ourselves that way,” Sharry said. “There are different people doing different things, and our movement will be increasingly confrontational with Republicans, including civil disobedience. A lot of people are going to say, ‘We’re not going to wait.’”¶ The White House isn’t ready to talk about the world after the debt limit fight yet, but officials have signaled strongly they want to put immigration back on the agenda.¶ Asked about future strategic plans after the shutdown Monday, a senior White House official said, “That’s a conversation for when the government opens and we haven’t defaulted.” But on Tuesday, Press Secretary Jay Carney specifically mentioned immigration when asked “how the White House proceeds” after the current fracas is history.¶ “Just like we wish for the country, for deficit reduction, for our economy, that the House would follow the Senate’s lead and pass comprehensive immigration reform with a big bipartisan vote,” he said. “That might be good for the Republican Party. Analysts say so; Republicans say so. We hope they do it.”¶ The president set immigration as his next priority in an interview with Univision Tuesday.¶ “Once that’s done, you know, the day after, I’m going to be pushing to say, call a vote on immigration reform,” Obama said. He also set up another fight with the House GOP on the issue.¶ “We had a very strong Democratic and Republican vote in the Senate,” Obama said. “The only thing right now that’s holding it back is, again, Speaker Boehner not willing to call the bill on the floor of the House of Representatives.”¶ Don’t expect the White House effort to include barnstorming across the country on behalf of immigration reform in the days after the fiscal crisis ends, reform proponents predict. Advocates said the White House has tried hard to help immigration reform along, and in the current climate that means trying to thread the needle with Republicans who support reform but have also reflexively opposed every one of Obama’s major policy proposals.¶ Democrats and advocates seem to hope the GOP comes back to immigration on its own, albeit with a boost from Democrats eager to join them. Polls show Republicans have taken on more of the blame from the fiscal battle of the past couple of weeks. But Tom Jensen, a pollster with the Democratic firm Public Policy Polling, said moving to pass immigration reform could be just what the doctor ordered to get the public back on the side of the Republicans.¶ “We’ve consistently found that a sizable chunk of Republican voters support immigration reform, and obviously a decent number of Republican politicians do too,” Jensen said. “After this huge partisan impasse, they may want to focus on something that’s not quite as polarized, and immigration would certainly fit the bill since we see voters across party lines calling for reform.”

**Immigration key to biotech**

**Dahms 3**, (executive director of the California State University System Biotechnology Program (CSUPERB); chair of the Workforce Committee, Biotechnology Industry Organization; and a member of the ASBMB Education and Professional Development Committee, (A. Stephen, “ Foreign Scientists Seen Essential to U.S. Biotechnology,” in Pan-Organizational Summit on the U.S. Science and Engineering Workforce: Meeting Summary, National Academy of Sciences, <http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/bookshelf/picrender.fcgi?book=nap10727&blobtype=pdf>)

The scarcity of skilled technicians is seen by the biotechnology industry in the U.S. and Canada as one of its most serious challenges. The success of this industry is dependent on the quality of its workforce, and the skills and talents of highly trained people are recognized as one of the most vital and dynamic sources of competitive advantage. The U.S. biotechnology industry workforce has been growing 14 to 17 percent annually over the last six years and is now over 190,000 and conservatively estimated to reach 500,000 by 2012. Despite efforts by the industry to encourage U.S. institutions to increase the production of needed specialists, a continual shortfall in the needed expertise requires access to foreign workers. Foreign workers with unique skills that are scarce in the U.S. can get permission to stay in the U.S. for up to six years under the H1B classification, after which they can apply for permanent resident status. There are currently over 600,000 foreign workers in this category across all industries, and they are critical to the success and global competitiveness of this nation. Of these H-1B visa holders, 46 percent are from India and 10 percent are from China, followed in descending order by Canada, Philippines, Taiwan, Korea, Japan, U.K., Pakistan, and the Russian Federation. Our annual national surveys have demonstrated that between 6 and 10 percent of the biotechnology workforce have H-1B visas. The constant shortfall in specialized technical workers that has been experienced by the biotechnology industry over the past six years has been partially alleviated by access to talented individuals from other nations. However, the industry’s need is sufficient to justify a 25 percent increase in H-1Bs in 2004. Biotechnology industry H-1B visa holders are mainly in highly sought after areas such as analytical chemistry, instrumentation specialization, organic synthesis, product safety and surveillance, clinical research/biostatistics, bio/pharm quality, medicinal chemistry, product scale-up, bioinformatics and applied genomics, computer science, cheminformatics, pharmacokinetics, and pharmacodynamics. Forty percent of H-1B foreign workers are at the Ph.D. level, 35 percent M.S., 20 percent B.S., and 5 percent M.D. In comparison, the U.S. biotechnology industry technical workforce is estimated to be 19 percent Ph.D., 17 percent M.S., 50 percent B.S., and 14 percent combined voc-ed/ community college trained. These and other survey data by industry human resource groups clearly show that the H-1B worker skills match the most pressing employment needs of the biotechnology industry. The data demonstrate that maintaining a reasonably-sized H-1B cap is critical to the industry. Although the national annual H-1B visa cap was raised from 115,000 to 195,000 in the 106th Congress via S. 2045, the cap has already been exceeded. The increased cap remains in effect until 2003 and efforts are under way to ensure that it remains high. The Third Annual National Survey of H-1Bs in the biotechnology industry found that 80 percent are from U.S. universities, and 85 percent of those eventually get green cards. Companies now spend, on average, $10,200 in processing fees and legal expenses to obtain each green card, an estimated cost to the industry of more than $150 million over the past 5 years. In the wake of the 9/11 World Trade Center attacks, debate has been focused on more restrictions on foreign students, a development that would have a severe impact upon the competitiveness of the U.S. biotechnology industry. Clearly, the H-1B route provides a temporary solution to shortages in the national and domestic biotechnology labor pools, shortages mirroring the inadequate production of appropriately trained U.S. nationals by U.S. institutions of higher learning. The reality is that universities have inadequate resources for expanding the training pipeline, particularly in the specialized areas of the research phase of company product development. Efforts should be directed toward influencing greater congressional and federal agency attention to these important topics.

**Extinction**

**Trewavas, 2000** – Institute of Cell and Molecular Biology at the University of Edinburgh  
(Anthony, “GM Is the Best Option We Have,” 6/5/2000, [www.agbioworld.org/biotech-info/articles/biotech-art/best\_option.html](http://www.agbioworld.org/biotech-info/articles/biotech-art/best_option.html))

In 535A.D. a volcano near the present **Krakatoa** exploded with the force of 200 million Hiroshima A bombs. The dense cloud of dust so reduced the intensity of the sun that for at least two years thereafter, summer turned to winter and crops here and elsewhere in the Northern hemisphere failed completely. The population survived by hunting a rapidly vanishing population of edible animals. The after-effects continued for a decade and human history was changed irreversibly. But the planet recovered. Such examples of benign nature's wisdom, in full flood as it were, dwarf and make miniscule the tiny modifications we make upon our environment. There are apparently 100 such volcanoes round the world that could at any time unleash forces as great. And even smaller volcanic explosions change our climate and can easily threaten the security of our food supply. Our hold on this planet is tenuous. In the present day an equivalent 535A.D. explosion would **destroy** much of our **civilisation**. Only those with agricultural technology sufficiently advanced would have a chance at survival. Colliding **asteroids** are another problem that requires us to be forward-looking accepting that technological advance may be **the only buffer between** us and **annihilation**. When people say to me they do not need GM, I am astonished at their prescience, their ability to read a benign future in a crystal ball that I cannot. Now is the time to experiment; not when a holocaust is upon us and it is too late. GM is a technology whose time has come and just in the nick of time. With each billion that mankind has added to the planet have come technological advances to increase food supply. In the 18th century, the start of agricultural mechanisation; in the 19th century knowledge of crop mineral requirements, the eventual Haber Bosch process for nitrogen reduction. In the 20th century plant genetics and breeding, and later the green revolution. Each time population growth has been sustained without enormous loss of life through starvation even though crisis often beckoned. For the 21st century, genetic manipulation is our **primary hope** to maintain developing and complex technological civilisations. When the **climate is changing** in unpredictable ways, diversity in agricultural technology is a strength and a necessity not a luxury. Diversity helps secure our food supply. We have heard much of the **precautionary principle** in recent years; my version of it is "be prepared".

## Drug Trade

#### Instability empirically denied

**Hartzell 2000** (Caroline A., 4/1/2000, Middle Atlantic Council of Latin American Studies Latin American Essays, “Latin America's civil wars: conflict resolution and institutional change.” http://www.accessmylibrary.com/coms2/summary\_0286-28765765\_ITM)

Latin America has been the site of fourteen civil wars during the post-World War II era, thirteen of which now have ended. Although not as civil war-prone as some other areas of the world, Latin America has endured some extremely violent and destabilizing intrastate conflicts. (2) The region's experiences with civil wars and their resolution thus may prove instructive for other parts of the world in which such conflicts continue to rage. By examining Latin America's civil wars in some depth not only might we better understand the circumstances under which such conflicts are ended but also the institutional outcomes to which they give rise. More specifically, this paper focuses on the following central questions regarding Latin America's civil wars: Has the resolution of these conflicts produced significant institutional change in the countries in which they were fought? What is the nature of the institutional change that has taken place in the wake of these civil wars? What are the factors that are responsible for shaping post-war institutional change?

#### There is no risk of another major terrorist attack

**Mueller, 06** (John, Foreign Affairs, September October 2006, p.2)//VP

A fully credible explanation for the fact that the United States has suffered no terrorist attacks since 9/11 is that the threat posed by homegrown or imported terrorists -- like that presented by Japanese Americans during World War II or by American Communists after it -- has been massively exaggerated. Is it possible that the haystack is essentially free of needles? The FBI embraces a spooky I-think-therefore-they-are line of reasoning when assessing the purported terrorist menace. In 2003, its director, Robert Mueller, proclaimed, "The greatest threat is from al Qaeda cells in the U.S. that we have not yet identified." He rather mysteriously deemed the threat from those unidentified entities to be "increasing in part because of the heightened publicity" surrounding such episodes as the 2002 Washington sniper shootings and the 2001 anthrax attacks (which had nothing to do with al Qaeda). But in 2001, the 9/11 hijackers received no aid from U.S.-based al Qaeda operatives for the simple reason that no such operatives appear to have existed. It is not at all clear that that condition has changed. Mueller also claimed to know that "al Qaeda maintains the ability and the intent to inflict significant casualties in the U.S. with little warning." If this was true -- if the terrorists had both the ability and the intent in 2003, and if the threat they presented was somehow increasing -- they had remained remarkably quiet by the time the unflappable Mueller repeated his alarmist mantra in 2005: "I remain very concerned about what we are not seeing." Intelligence estimates in 2002 held that there were as many as 5,000 al Qaeda terrorists and supporters in the United States. However, a secret FBI report in 2005 wistfully noted that although the bureau had managed to arrest a few bad guys here and there after more than three years of intense and well-funded hunting, it had been unable to identify a single true al Qaeda sleeper cell anywhere in the country. Thousands of people in the United States have had their overseas communications monitored under a controversial warrantless surveillance program. Of these, fewer than ten U.S. citizens or residents per year have aroused enough suspicion to impel the agencies spying on them to seek warrants authorizing surveillance of their domestic communications as well; none of this activity, it appears, has led to an indictment on any charge whatever. In addition to massive eavesdropping and detention programs, every year some 30,000 "national security letters" are issued without judicial review, forcing businesses and other institutions to disclose confidential information about their customers without telling anyone they have done so. That process has generated thousands of leads that, when pursued, have led nowhere. Some 80,000 Arab and Muslim immigrants have been subjected to fingerprinting and registration, another 8,000 have been called in for interviews with the FBI, and over 5,000 foreign nationals have been imprisoned in initiatives designed to prevent terrorism. This activity, notes the Georgetown University law professor David Cole, has not resulted in a single conviction for a terrorist crime. In fact, only a small number of people picked up on terrorism charges -- always to great official fanfare -- have been convicted at all, and almost all of these convictions have been for other infractions, particularly immigration violations. Some of those convicted have clearly been mental cases or simply flaunting jihadist bravado -- rattling on about taking down the Brooklyn Bridge with a blowtorch, blowing up the Sears Tower if only they could get to Chicago, beheading the prime minister of Canada, or flooding lower Manhattan by somehow doing something terrible to one of those tunnels APPETITE FOR DESTRUCTION One reason al Qaeda and "al Qaeda types" seem not to be trying very hard to repeat 9/11 may be that that dramatic act of destruction itself proved counterproductive by massively heightening concerns about terrorism around the world. No matter how much they might disagree on other issues (most notably on the war in Iraq), there is a compelling incentive for states -- even ones such as Iran, Libya, Sudan, and Syria -- to cooperate in cracking down on al Qaeda, because they know that they could easily be among its victims. The FBI may not have uncovered much of anything within the United States since 9/11, but thousands of apparent terrorists have been rounded, or rolled, up overseas with U.S. aid and encouragement Although some Arabs and Muslims took pleasure in the suffering inflicted on 9/11 -- Schadenfreude in German, shamateh in Arabic -- the most common response among jihadists and religious nationalists was a vehement rejection of al Qaeda's strategy and methods. When Soviet troops invaded Afghanistan in 1979, there were calls for jihad everywhere in Arab and Muslim lands, and tens of thousands flocked to the country to fight the invaders. In stark contrast, when the U.S. military invaded in 2001 to topple an Islamist regime, there was, as the political scientist Fawaz Gerges points out, a "deafening silence" from the Muslim world, and only a trickle of jihadists went to fight the Americans. Other jihadists publicly blamed al Qaeda for their post-9/11 problems and held the attacks to be shortsighted and hugely miscalculated. The post-9/11 willingness of governments around the world to take on international terrorists has been much reinforced and amplified by subsequent, if scattered, terrorist activity outside the United States. Thus, a terrorist bombing in Bali in 2002 galvanized the Indonesian government into action. Extensive arrests and convictions -- including of leaders who had previously enjoyed some degree of local fame and political popularity -- seem to have severely degraded the capacity of the chief jihadist group in Indonesia, Jemaah Islamiyah. After terrorists attacked Saudis in Saudi Arabia in 2003, that country, very much for self-interested reasons, became considerably more serious about dealing with domestic terrorism; it soon clamped down on radical clerics and preachers. Some rather inept terrorist bombings in Casablanca in 2003 inspired a similarly determined crackdown by Moroccan authorities. And the 2005 bombing in Jordan of a wedding at a hotel (an unbelievably stupid target for the terrorists) succeeded mainly in outraging the Jordanians: according to a Pew poll, the percentage of the population expressing a lot of confidence in bin Laden to "do the right thing" dropped from 25 percent to less than one percent after the attack THREAT PERCEPTIONS The results of policing activity overseas suggest that the absence of results in the United States has less to do with terrorists' cleverness or with investigative incompetence than with the possibility that few, if any, terrorists exist in the country. It also suggests that al Qaeda's ubiquity and capacity to do damage may have, as with so many perceived threats, been exaggerated. Just because some terrorists may wish to do great harm does not mean that they are able to. Gerges argues that mainstream Islamists -- who make up the vast majority of the Islamist political movement -- gave up on the use of force before 9/11, except perhaps against Israel, and that the jihadists still committed to violence constitute a tiny minority. Even this small group primarily focuses on various "infidel" Muslim regimes and considers jihadists who carry out violence against the "far enemy" -- mainly Europe and the United States -- to be irresponsible, reckless adventurers who endanger the survival of the whole movement. In this view, 9/11 was a sign of al Qaeda's desperation, isolation, fragmentation, and decline, not of its strength. Those attacks demonstrated, of course, that al Qaeda -- or at least 19 of its members -- still possessed some fight. And none of this is to deny that more terrorist attacks on the United States are still possible. Nor is it to suggest that al Qaeda is anything other than a murderous movement. Moreover, after the ill-considered U.S. venture in Iraq is over, freelance jihadists trained there may seek to continue their operations elsewhere -- although they are more likely to focus on places such as Chechnya than on the United States. A unilateral American military attack against Iran could cause that country to retaliate, probably with very wide support within the Muslim world, by aiding anti-American insurgencies in Afghanistan and Iraq and inflicting damage on Israel and on American interests worldwide….But while keeping such potential dangers in mind, it is worth remembering that the total number of people killed since 9/11 by al Qaeda or al Qaedalike operatives outside of Afghanistan and Iraq is not much higher than the number who drown in bathtubs in the United States in a single year, and that the lifetime chance of an American being killed by international terrorism is about one in 80,000 -- about the same chance of being killed by a comet or a meteor. Even if there were a 9/11-scale attack every three months for the next five years, the likelihood that an individual American would number among the dead would be two hundredths of a percent (or one in 5,000). Although it remains heretical to say so, the evidence so far suggests that fears of the omnipotent terrorist -- reminiscent of those inspired by images of the 20-foot-tall Japanese after Pearl Harbor or the 20-foot-tall Communists at various points in the Cold War (particularly after Sputnik) -- may have been overblown, the threat presented within the United States by al Qaeda greatly exaggerated. The massive and expensive homeland security apparatus erected since 9/11 may be persecuting some, spying on many, inconveniencing most, and taxing all to defend the United States against an enemy that scarcely exists.

## Financial Overhaul

No brink – Sarugul does not give a uniqueness warrant for financing

**Economic decline doesn’t cause war**

**Deudney 91** – Hewlett Fellow in Science, Technology, and Society at the Center for Energy and Environmental Studies at Princeton

(Daniel, “Environment and Security: Muddled Thinking”, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, p. 27)

Poverty Wars. In a second scenario, declining living standards first cause internal turmoil. then war. If groups at all levels of affluence protect their standard of living by pushing deprivation on other groups class war and revolutionary upheavals could result. Faced with these pressures, liberal democracy and free market systems could increasingly be replaced by authoritarian systems capable of maintaining minimum order.9 If authoritarian regimes are more war-prone because they lack democratic control, and if revolutionary regimes are warprone because of their ideological fervor and isolation, then the world is likely to become more violent. The record of previous depressions supports the proposition that widespread economic stagnation and unmet economic expectations contribute to international conflict. Although initially compelling, this scenario has major flaws. One is that it is arguably based on unsound economic theory. Wealth is formed not so much by the availability of cheap natural resources as by capital formation through savings and more efficient production. Many resource-poor countries, like Japan, are very wealthy, while many countries with more extensive resources are poor. Environmental constraints require an end to economic growth based on growing use of raw materials, but not necessarily an end to growth in the production of goods and services. In addition, economic decline does not necessarily produce conflict. How societies respond to economic decline may largely depend upon the rate at which such declines occur. And as people get poorer, they may become less willing to spend scarce resources for military forces. As Bernard Brodie observed about the modein era, “The predisposing factors to military aggression are full bellies, not empty ones.”’” The experience of economic depressions over the last two centuries may be irrelevant, because such depressions were characterized by under-utilized production capacity and falling resource prices. In the 1930 increased military spending stimulated economies, but if economic growth is retarded by environmental constraints, military spending will exacerbate the problem. Power Wars. A third scenario is that environmental degradation might cause war by altering the relative power of states; that is, newly stronger states may be tempted to prey upon the newly weaker ones, or weakened states may attack and lock in their positions before their power ebbs firther. But such alterations might not lead to war as readily as the lessons of history suggest, because economic power and military power are not as tightly coupled as in the past. The economic power positions of Germany and Japan have changed greatly since World War 11, but these changes have not been accompanied by war or threat of war. In the contemporary world, whole industries rise, fall, and relocate, causing substantial fluctuations in the economic well-being of regions and peoples without producing wars. There is no reason to believe that changes in relative wealth and power caused by the uneven impact of environmental degradation would inevitably lead to war. Even if environmental degradation were to destroy the basic social and economic fabric of a country or region, the impact on international order may not be very great. Among the first casualties in such country would be the capacity to wage war. The poor and wretched of the earth may be able to deny an outside aggressor an easy conquest, but they are themselves a minimal threat to other states. Contemporary offensive military operations require complex organizational skills, specialized industrial products and surplus wealth.

#### Automatic exchange of information doesn’t solve – recipients can’t effectively parse the data.

The Economist 13 [2/16, “Automatic response”, http://www.economist.com/news/special-report/21571561-way-make-exchange-tax-information-work-automatic-response]

Another problem with automatic exchange is the huge quantities of data it produces. Europe’s tax authorities have struggled to stay on top of the information swapped under the directive. An official from a British dependency taking part in the EUSD reportedly complained that some countries which receive encrypted DVDs with client information do not even get round to asking for the decryption key. And information is not necessarily helpful if the recipient still has to penetrate the web of shell companies, trusts and foundations between the account and the beneficial owner.¶ A further concern is the risk of misuse of information by corrupt administrations, or rogue government employees, such as the sale of personal financial data to would-be kidnappers. Global automatic exchange is “a developed-world solution for a global economy unsuited to it”, argues Geoff Cook of Jersey Finance. Some developing countries lack the administration to deal with it, says Gurbachan Singh, a tax lawyer in Singapore. In places like Indonesia “you may have a tax officer but not a proper tax office.”

#### The US is already committed to automatic exchange of information with Mexico.

CTU 12 (Curtis Tax Updates, Curtis, Mallet-Prevost, Colt & Mosle LLP, 11/29, http://curtistax.blogspot.com/2012/11/us-and-mexico-sign-intergovernmental.html]

On November 19, 2012, the U.S. and Mexico signed an intergovernmental agreement ("IGA") to improve international tax compliance including with respect to the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act ("FATCA"). FATCA generally requires a foreign financial institution ("FFI") to identify U.S. account holders and report information regarding them to the Internal Revenue Service. If an FFI fails to comply, the FFI will be subject to a 30% U.S. withholding tax on income it receives on its U.S. investments. ¶ More than 50 countries have engaged in discussions with the U.S. in response to FATCA. Mexico became the third country (the U.K. and Denmark were the first two countries) to enter into an IGA. Like the IGAs with the U.K. and Denmark, the US-Mexico IGA requires annual, automatic information exchange, on a reciprocal basis, with respect to financial accounts in 2013 and subsequent years. Under the IGA, Mexico will automatically provide to the U.S. information it collected from Mexican FFIs on financial accounts in Mexico held by U.S. residents, and the U.S. will also automatically provide Mexico with information it collects on financial accounts in the U.S. held by Mexican residents. Generally, the two governments will exchange the information within 9 months after the year-end. However, the information relating to accounts in 2013 is not required to be exchanged until September 30, 2015.

**Econ resilient**

Fareed Zakaria (editor of Newsweek International) December 2009 “The Secrets of Stability,” http://www.newsweek.com/id/226425/page/2]

One year ago, the world seemed as if it might be coming apart. The global financial system, which had fueled a great expansion of capitalism and trade across the world, was crumbling. All the certainties of the age of globalization—about the virtues of free markets, trade, and technology—were being called into question. Faith in the American model had collapsed. The financial industry had crumbled. Once-roaring emerging markets like China, India, and Brazil were sinking. Worldwide trade was shrinking to a degree not seen since the 1930s. Pundits whose bearishness had been vindicated predicted we were doomed to a long, painful bust, with cascading failures in sector after sector, country after country. In a widely cited essay that appeared in The Atlantic n this May, Simon Johnson, former chief economist of the International Monetary Fund, wrote: "The conventional wisdom among the elite is still that the current slump 'cannot be as bad as the Great Depression.' This view is wrong. What we face now could, in fact, be worse than the Great Depression." Others predicted that these economic shocks would lead to political instability and violence in the worst-hit countries. At his confirmation hearing in February, the new U.S. director of national intelligence, Adm. Dennis Blair, cautioned the Senate that "the financial crisis and global recession are likely to produce a wave of economic crises in emerging-market nations over the next year." Hillary Clinton endorsed this grim view. And she was hardly alone. Foreign Policy ran a cover story predicting serious unrest in several emerging markets. Of one thing everyone was sure: nothing would ever be the same again. Not the financial industry, not capitalism, not globalization. One year later, how much has the world really changed? Well, Wall Street is home to two fewer investment banks (three, if you count Merrill Lynch). Some regional banks have gone bust. There was some turmoil in Moldova and (entirely unrelated to the financial crisis) in Iran. Severe problems remain, like high unemployment in the West, and we face new problems caused by responses to the crisis—soaring debt and fears of inflation. But overall, things look nothing like they did in the 1930s. The predictions of economic and political collapse have not materialized at all. A key measure of fear and fragility is the ability of poor and unstable countries to borrow money on the debt markets. So consider this: the sovereign bonds of tottering Pakistan have returned 168 percent so far this year. All this doesn't add up to a recovery yet, but it does reflect a return to some level of normalcy. And that rebound has been so rapid that even the shrewdest observers remain puzzled. "The question I have at the back of my head is 'Is that it?' " says Charles Kaye, the co-head of Warburg Pincus. "We had this huge crisis, and now we're back to business as usual?"This revival did not happen because markets managed to stabilize themselves on their own. Rather, governments, having learned the lessons of the Great Depression, were determined not to repeat the same mistakes once this crisis hit. By massively expanding state support for the economy—through central banks and national treasuries—they buffered the worst of the damage. (Whether they made new mistakes in the process remains to be seen.) The extensive social safety nets that have been established across the industrialized world also cushioned the pain felt by many. Times are still tough, but things are nowhere near as bad as in the 1930s, when governments played a tiny role in national economies. It's true that the massive state interventions of the past year may be fueling some new bubbles: the cheap cash and government guarantees provided to banks, companies, and consumers have fueled some irrational exuberance in stock and bond markets. Yet these rallies also demonstrate the return of confidence, and confidence is a very powerful economic force. When John Maynard Keynes described his own prescriptions for economic growth, he believed government action could provide only a temporary fix until the real motor of the economy started cranking again—the animal spirits of investors, consumers, and companies seeking risk and profit. Beyond all this, though, I believe there's a fundamental reason why we have not faced global collapse in the last year. It is the same reason that we weathered the stock-market crash of 1987, the recession of 1992, the Asian crisis of 1997, the Russian default of 1998, and the tech-bubble collapse of 2000. The current global economic system is inherently more resilient than we think. The world today is characterized by three major forces for stability, each reinforcing the other and each historical in nature.

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**Their risk calculus is born out of neoliberal logic---uncertainty is a trick used to either promote or reject policy based on ideological predispositions**

Pellizzoni 11, Associate Professor of Environmental Sociology at the University of Trieste, Italy, April 2011, “Governing through disorder: Neoliberal environmental governance and social theory,” Global Environmental Change, Vol. 21, p. 795-803//VP

This article started out with two aims: ﬁrst, to identify at the deepest, ontological, level the underpinnings of widespread environmental policy approaches often associated with neoliberalism. Second, to show that different socio-environmental theoretical perspectives have had difﬁculty confronting these underpinnings, which affects their capacity to interpret the latter’s implications for the governance of the biophysical world. Neoliberalism draws on established traditions in political liberalism and market capitalism, yet is characterized by a novel understanding of the ontological quality of nature. ‘Nature’ is no longer conceived as an objectively given, though cognitively mediated, reality, but as a constitutively ﬂuid entity, a contingency purposefully produced and controlled for instrumental ends. Governance through uncertainty, instability or ‘disorder’ thus seems to be the distinguishing feature of the ‘neoliberalisation of nature’. This ideational core may be considered the ﬁrst reason for the sense of unity often felt when contemplating the array of sectors, approaches and cases characterizing current market-oriented environmental governance, and at the same time for the sense of uneasiness towards neoliberalism that environmental social theory conveys. Whatever the judgment, it is important to grasp what is at stake with neoliberal governance of nature. Browsing social science books and journals, one realizes that much critical energy has been focused on questioning the objectivist account of nature that allegedly dominates current policy narratives and practices. Only a discerning scholarship has begun to realize that objectivism and antiobjectivism are losing relevance as categories capable of distinguishing intellectual and stakeholder positions, and that they increasingly become claims usable in power games over the biophysical world. Attention, for example, has been recently paid to the instrumental use of uncertainty (Freudenburg et al., 2008; Jacques et al., 2008), which, depending on the circumstances, is used either to ask for policy-making (as with GMOs) or to call for policy-avoiding (as with ‘unwarranted’ restrictive measures related to climate change). The very possibility of appealing to ‘sound science’ either for evidence of no problems, or no evidence of problems indicates the fundamentally anti-objectivist attitude that characterizes present political and cultural frameworks. Policy promoters share this attitude with their opponents. Those who ask for ‘precaution’ use the same arguments in reverse, requiring action when and where there is no evidence of no problems. 11 This commonality entails that appeals to uncertainty are devoid of any strategic relevance in current controversies; rather, they play a tactical role. This is likely to represent a problem above all for counter-forces to neoliberalism, to the extent that in a tactical struggle the most advantaged are those provided with greater organizational, economic, cognitive and legal resources (to say nothing of military ones). In short, we are today in front of a refashioning of the symbolic order of society vis-a` -vis its biophysical underpinnings. In this change, neoliberal discourses, policies and practices are at the same time a powerful driver and a result. Disorder becomes order to the extent that uncertainty, contingency and instability are regarded not as disabling by-products of governance but as enabling ways of governing. In the public realm, this ends up constituting a sort of shared horizon of meaning: not only is no new ‘order’ (in the traditional sense) in sight, but anti-essentialism overﬂows from intellectual avant-gardes to become a widespread, albeit often implicit or negotiable, worldview.

#### **Giving the tool of imagination over to the state exonerates us from responsibility – we should imagine our own role in violence**

**Kappeler 95** (Susanne, The Will to Violence, pgs 9-11)

War does not suddenly break out in a peaceful society; sexual violence is not the disturbance of otherwise equal gender relations. Racist attacks do not shoot like lightning out of a non-racist sky, and the sexual exploitation of children is no solitary problem in a world otherwise just to children. The violence of our most commonsense everyday thinking, and especially our personal will to violence, constitute the conceptual preparation , the ideological armament and the intellectual mobilization which make the 'outbreak' of war, of sexual violence , of racist attacks, of murder and destruction possible at all. 'We are the war,' writes Slavenka Drakulic at the end of her existential analysis of the question, 'what is war?': I do not know what war is, I want to tell my friend, but I see it everywhere . It is in the blood-soaked street in Sarajevo, after 20 people have been killed while they queued for bread. But it is also in your non-comprehension, in my unconscious cruelty towards you. in the fact that you have a yellow form [for refugees] and I don't, in the way in which it grows inside ourselves and changes our feelings, relationships, values - in short: us. We are the war. , , And I am afraid that we cannot hold anyone else responsible. We make this war possible , we permit it to happen. 'We are the war' - and we also are' the sexual violence , the racist violence , the exploitation and the will to violence in all its manifestations in a society in so-called 'peacetime", for we make them possible and we permit them to happen. 'We are the war' does not mean that the responsibility for a war is shared collectively and diffusely by an entire society - which would be equivalent to exonerating warlords and politicians and profiteers or, as Ulrich Beck says, upholding the notion of 'collective irresponsibility', where people are no longer held responsible for their actions, and where the conception of universal responsibility becomes the equivalent of a universal acquittal. 6 On the contrary, the object is precisely to analyse the specific and differential responsibility of everyone in their diverse situations. Decisions to unleash a war are indeed taken at particular levels of power by those in a position to make them and to command such collective action. We need to hold them clearly responsible for their decisions and actions without lessening theirs by any collective 'assumption' of responsibility. Yet our habit of focusing on the stage where the major dramas of power take place tends to obscure our sight in relation to our own sphere of competence, our own power and our own responsibility - leading to the well- known illusion of our apparent 'powerlessness' and its accompanying phenomenon - our so-called political disillusionment. Single citizens even more so those of other nations - have come to feel secure in their obvious non-responsibility for such large-scale political events as, say, the wars in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina or Somalia \_ since the decisions for such events are always made elsewhere. Yet our insight that indeed we are not responsible for the decisions of a Serbian general or a Croatian president tends to mislead us in to thinking that therefore we have no responsibility at all, not even for forming our own judgment, and thus into underrating the responsibility we do have within our own sphere of action. In particular, it seems to absolve us from having to try to see any relation between our own actions and those events, or to recognize the connections between those political decisions and our own personal decisions. It not only shows that we participate in what Beck calls 'organized irresponsibility', upholding the apparent lack of connection between bureaucratically, institutionally, nationally and also individually organized separate competences. It also proves the phenomenal and unquestioned alliance of our personal thinking with the thinking of the major power mongers. For we tend to think that we cannot 'do ' anything , say, about a war, because we deem ourselves to be in the wrong situation; because we are not where the major decisions are made. Which is why many of those not yet entirely disillusioned with politics tend to engage in a form of mental deputy politics, in the style of 'What would I do if I were the general, the prime minister, the president, the foreign minister or the minister of defence?' Since we seem to regard their mega spheres of action as the only worthwhile and truly effective ones, and since our political analyses tend to dwell there first of all, any question of what I would do if I were indeed myself tends to peter out in the comparative insignificance of having what is perceived as 'virtually no possibilities': what I could do seems petty and futile. For my own action I obviously desire the range of action of a general, a prime minister, or a General Secretary of the UN - finding expression in ever more prevalent formulations like ‘I want to stop this war', 'I want military intervention ', 'I want to stop this backlash', or 'I want a moral revolution. '? 'We are this war', however, even if we do not command the troops or participate in so-called peace talks, namely as Drakulic says, in our 'non- comprehension' : our willed refusal to feel responsible for our own thinking and for working out our own understanding, preferring innocently to drift along the ideological current of prefabricated arguments or less than innocently taking advantage of the advantages these offer. And we 'are' the war in our 'unconscious cruelty towards you', our tolerance of the 'fact that you have a yellow form for refugees and I don 't' - our readiness, in other words, to build identities, one for ourselves and one for refugees, one of our own and one for the 'others'. We share in the responsibility for this war and its violence in the way we let them grow inside us, that is, in the way we shape 'our feelings, our relationships, our values' according to the structures and the values of war and violence.

**The affirmative is utopian—their faith in capitalism will drive us to extinction.**

**Kassiola, 90** (Joel Jay, The Death of Industrial Civilization: The Limits to Economic Growth and the Repoliticization of Advanced Industrial Society, Pg. 165)//VP

The reader might (prematurely) conclude at this point that any limits-to-growth theorist who predicts the death of industrial civilization and prescribes the establishment of a transindustrial society is guilty of utopian naivete. On the contrary, advocates of limits-based, postindustrial social transformation would reply (as I think Milbrath would) that it is those members of the faithful who accept the gospel of industrialism and its dependence upon the continuation of both unlimited economic growth and the postindustrial status quo, who are utopian. Their naivete will become increasingly evident as the limits to growth get closer and the dangers to society increase; when the apocalyptic consequences of growth-addiction begin to materialize and the flawed normative foundations of postindustrialism are exposed. Time is running out, as some popular media have begun to suggest with regard to several environmental threats recently made prominent: global warming, stratospheric ozone depletion, acid rain, deforestation, ocean pollution, and so on.

#### Neoliberalism must be rejected in every shape and form – ethical obligation – alt is specifically in the language of inclusion of every citizen - that’s the key to solvency

Harvey, 09 (David Harvey; Professor of anthropology and geography at the graduate center of the city University of New York; Organizing for the anti-capitalist transition; <http://seminario10anosdepois.wordpress.com/>)//VP

A revolutionary politics that can grasp the nettle of endless compound capital ¶ accumulation and eventually shut it down as the prime motor of human history ¶ requires a sophisticated understanding of how social change occurs. The ¶ failings of past endeavors to build a lasting socialism and communism have to ¶ be avoided and lessons from that immensely complicated history must be ¶ learned. Yet the absolute necessity for a coherent anti-capitalist revolutionary ¶ movement must also be recognized. The fundamental aim of that movement is ¶ to assume social command over both the production and distribution of ¶ surpluses.¶ We urgently need an explicit revolutionary theory suited to our times. I propose ¶ a "co-revolutionary theory" derived from an understanding of Marx's account of ¶ how capitalism arose out of feudalism. Social change arises through the ¶ dialectical unfolding of relations between seven moments within the body ¶ politic of capitalism viewed as an ensemble or assemblage of activities and ¶ practices:¶ a) technological and organizational forms of production, exchange, and ¶ consumption¶ b) relations to nature¶ c) social relations between people¶ d) mental conceptions of the world, embracing knowledges and cultural ¶ understandings and beliefs¶ e) labor processes and production of specific goods, geographies, services, or ¶ affects¶ f) institutional, legal and governmental arrangements¶ g) the conduct of daily life that underpins social reproduction.¶ Each one of these moments is internally dynamic and internally marked by ¶ tensions and contradictions (just think of mental conceptions of the world) but ¶ all of them are co-dependent and co-evolve in relation to each other. The ¶ transition to capitalism entailed a mutually supporting movement across all ¶ seven moments. New technologies could not be identified and practices without ¶ new mental conceptions of the world (including that of the relation to nature ¶ and social relations). Social theorists have the habit of taking just one of these ¶ moments and viewing it as the "silver bullet" that causes all change. They are all wrong. ¶ It is the dialectical motion across all of these moments that really counts even ¶ as there is uneven development in that motion.¶ When capitalism itself undergoes one of its phases of renewal, it does so ¶ precisely by co-evolving all moments, obviously not without tensions, struggles, ¶ fights, and contradictions. But consider how these seven moments were ¶ configured around 1970 before the neoliberal surge and consider how they look ¶ now, and you will see they have all changed in ways that re-define the operative ¶ characteristics of capitalism viewed as a non-Hegelian totality.¶ An anti-capitalist political movement can start anywhere (in labor processes, ¶ around mental conceptions, in the relation to nature, in social relations, in the ¶ design of revolutionary technologies and organizational forms, out of daily life, ¶ or through attempts to reform institutional and administrative structures ¶ including the reconfiguration of state powers). The trick is to keep the political ¶ movement moving from one moment to another in mutually reinforcing ways. ¶ This was how capitalism arose out of feudalism and this is how something ¶ radically different called communism, socialism, or whatever must arise out of ¶ capitalism. Previous attempts to create a communist or socialist alternative ¶ fatally failed to keep the dialectic between the different moments in motion and ¶ failed to embrace the unpredictabilities and uncertainties in the dialectical ¶ movement between them. Capitalism has survived precisely by keeping the ¶ dialectical movement between the moments going and constructively embracing ¶ the inevitable tensions, including crises.

#### Permutation coopts revolutionary potential- empirically proven in Latin America

EMIR SADER, PhD Poli Sci Univ of Sau Paolo THE WEAKEST LINK? Neoliberalism in Latin America New Left Review 52, July-August 2008 <http://newleftreview.org/II/52/emir-sader-the-weakest-link-neoliberalism-in-latin-america>

Cross-cutting these political cycles, three overall strategies of the Latin American left can be discerned. The first sequence, dating back to the 1940s, was one of major structural reforms contemporaneous with the hegemony of the import-substitution model. The left opted for an alliance with sectors of the national business elite in the name of economic modernization, agrarian reform and a certain autonomy with respect to Northern imperialism. This strategy was implemented by legendary nationalist leaders such as Getúlio Vargas of Brazil, Lázaro Cárdenas of Mexico and Juan Perón of Argentina, in concert with parties of the left or centre-left. In Chile, textbook cases of this approach were the Popular Front of 1938 and the Allende administration in 1970–73. But the programme failed at the same time as the industrialization effort, when the internationalization of economies pushed the corporate elites into solid alliance with international capital, laying the groundwork for the eventual neoliberal model. These same entrepreneurs also supported the military dictatorships of the Southern Cone, making no secret of their readiness to liquidate the popular movement for the sake of an export-centred economy geared to luxury domestic consumption by way of intense labour exploitation. Allende’s government, based on the Communist and Socialist parties, with a programme that envisaged the nationalization of 150 leading corporations, constituted the most advanced example of the attempt to progress from reformist policies to a socialist overcoming of capitalism. Among the multiple reasons for its defeat, there can be no doubt that the fact that Allende started out with just 34 per cent of the vote, and that three years later his government’s share had only risen to 44 per cent, was a major obstacle for implementing such a radical programme. Unidad Popular also underestimated the class nature of the state. It neglected therefore to institute an alternative power outside the traditional apparatus, which ultimately cornered and smothered the executive. The Chilean and Uruguayan military coups were carried out in the year that marked the transition from a long, expansive cycle to a recessive one, triggered by the oil crisis of 1973. A page of history had been definitively turned, and with it one strategy of the Latin American left was now closed. A second great strategy emerged with the Cuban revolution. Any revolutionary victory—above all when it is the first of its kind in a whole region—carries charismatic persuasive force, as we know from the Russian and Chinese experiences in 1917 and 1949. The Cuban triumph coincided with the end of the cycle of Latin American economic expansion under the popular governments and democratic regimes that had prevailed over much of the continent during the 1940s and 50s. The first Argentine coup was carried out in 1955, the second in 1966; the Brazilian and Bolivian coups took place in 1964, and already by 1954 Guatemala was in the throes of counter-revolution. It seemed that the cycle of democratic governments had run its course, in parallel with the economic crises. It was then that Cuba unexpectedly presented an alternative route, in contrast to the impasse that popular struggles in other countries had reached under their traditional leaderships. Latin America was no stranger to guerrilla movements; it had known rural insurgencies such as those of Nicaragua and El Salvador in the 1930s, as well as the national-revolutionary struggles in Mexico in the 1910s, or in Bolivia in 1952. Yet events in Cuba radiated a special appeal, pointing the way to a new epoch for the left. Due to the similarity of levels of development reached at that period by most of the countries of Latin America, the Cuban revolution was immediately more influential in the region than the Russian revolution had been in Europe in its day. All the more so, thanks to the way it was presented by such—attractive, if misguided—codifications as Régis Debray’s account of the Cuban experience and how it might be replicated in other countries and continents. The massive congresses hosted by Cuba—Tricontinental (1965) and OLAS (1966)—were instrumental in giving huge momentum and worldwide publicity to the new strategy, which was also exemplified by the activities of Che Guevara in Africa and Latin America. The guerrilla struggles played out in three distinct phases over the next decades. The first, in the 1960s, had a rural character, with hubs in Venezuela, Guatemala and Peru; it ended with Che’s death in Bolivia just as he was attempting to coordinate these with other movements that were beginning to appear in Uruguay, Brazil and Argentina. The second phase was that of the urban guerrillas in the three latter countries, which operated between the late 1960s and early 1970s. The third phase was once more based in the countryside, inspired by the victory of the Sandinistas in 1979, and centred throughout the 1980s chiefly in Guatemala and El Salvador. The Sandinista electoral defeat in 1990 coincided with the shift to a unipolar world under the imperial hegemony of the US, which put an end to the viability of guerrilla strategies. The impossibility of military victory in other countries forced Guatemalan and Salvadoran fighters to reinsert themselves into mainstream political institutions, and the heyday of guerrillero strategies was basically over. At the same time, the global realignment after 1990 had far-reaching consequences for the parties of the traditional left, both nationalist and social-democratic. Their adherence to neoliberal policies, and the effects of these policies themselves, disabled the trade-union movements and the broader gamut of left-wing forces. The collapse of the USSR and the socialist camp precipitated a conclusive crisis for Communist parties across the continent. Several changed their names and even their natures, as was the case with the Brazilian CP; others simply faded away, while those that survived were left in social, political and ideological quarantine. The other forces of the left were variously affected by the new conditions. The Brazilian Workers’ Party (PT), the Uruguayan Frente Amplio and the Nicaraguan Frente Sandinista all evolved into parties of the centre-left, accepting when in power the economic models they had fought against in opposition. Of the former guerrilla groupings, only the Frente Farabundo Martí of El Salvador has managed to survive as a significant political force since laying down its arms. The MIR in Chile, the Montoneros and the PRT–ERP in Argentina, the ALN and the VPR in Brazil, and the guerrilla groups in Peru and Venezuela have all been dissolved, whilst the Tupamaros in Uruguay have reinvented themselves as a political force that bears no relationship to their past as a guerrilla movement.

#### the aff is an attempt to know where all money is at all times – it is a government attempt to keep tabs on all flows of money– We control the link debate and root cause of your impacts – the aff is a new form of imperialism that the US uses to track US money

Amiya Kumar **Bagchi** 20**06** (PhD in political economics from Cambridge University, “Neoliberal imperialism, corporate feudalism and the contemporary origins of dirty money”, Institute of Development Studies Kolkata, Idsk1@vsnl.net www.idsk.org)

Primitive accumulation under capitalism involved the generation and circulation of considerable amounts of dirty money. From the time of Henry the Navigator of Portugal in the 15th century, enslaving human beings, piracy in the open seas and attacks on the realms of people who had caused no harm to the attackers have played a major role in the process of primitive accumulation. Queen Elizabeth I of England had shares in the piratical ventures of Francis Drake, John Hawkins and other heroes of English history. Even when England was not formally at war with Spain, these sea captains ventured out with the specific objective of plundering the Spanish galleons laden with treasure obtained from the mines of Mexico and Peru. And, of course, the pages of the story of the Spanish conquest of the Americas and the Caribbean are spattered with the blood of innocents, in their thousands and millions. Among the circle of the European kingdoms and oligarchies, a code of mutually recognized international law came to govern the relations between states, especially after the treaty of 1648, formally ending the Thirty Years War. But that stamp of legality did not prevent the blood-letting between the major combatants in the succeeding centuries (Bagchi, 2005, chapter 4). Capitalism has always been red in tooth and claw, perhaps more so in the colonies than in its homeland. But the twentieth century witnessed the most turbulent river of blood flowing across the face of Continental Europe. Beyond Europe, no legal restrictions, other than some agreed formula for dividing up the spoils from the loot of the non-white lands, were recognized in the imperialist assault (led by European powers and the USA but joined by Japan from the 1890s) against non- European peoples. From the beginning of the triumphant march of capitalism, resources flowed from the lands Europeans conquered to the heartland of capitalism, the Netherlands, Britain and France, and thence to the overseas settlements of Europeans such as the USA, Australia, Canada and New Zealand. Most of that money was dirty since it was not earned in fair exchange but as he fruit of slave labour and tribute extracted as the self-ransoming of the conquered peoples (Marx, 1867/1886, chapters XXV-XXXIII; Dobb, 1946; Bagchi, 1972a, 1982, 2002, 2005; Patnaik, 2005). The centuries long, systematic transfer of the surplus from the Third World to G7 countries and their close allies is yet to be recognized by mainstream economists and historians, but for the last forty years or so, some types of money transfer have forced themselves on the attention of even the watchdogs of capitalism. A considerable amount of work has been done by economists associated with the IMF, World Bank, the Institute of International Economics and independent researchers such as James Boyce, Léonce Ndikumana (Boyce and Ndikumana, 2000; Ndikumana and Boyce, 2002), Raymond Baker (Baker, 1999; Baker and Dawson et al., 2003), Jennifer Nordin (Baker and Nordin, 2005), Patricia Adams (2005a, 2005b) and others **enquiring into capital flight and money-laundering**. Baker has classified dirty money into three categories, criminal, corrupt and commercial and regards the commercial route much more important than the two others. In order **to understand the causality**, however, we need a more fleshed-out political economy framework than his idea that these origins are loopholes in the free-market system. If we mean by the free-market system the actually existing capitalism with an overarching imperial order, then **capitalism and generation of dirty money have been more or less synonymous**. Take, for example, two of the props of capitalist competition associated with its use of the state system. Arms trade has always involved corrupt or non- transparent relations between governments and arms manufacturers and arms traders. A second prop, espionage and subversion of hostile states have always involved the handing out of money that must not be publicly accounted for. Both these fountains of dirty money have become gushers from the time the Cold War began and have been spouting even bigger streams since the fall of the Soviet Union. It was recently revealed that the annual budget of the CIA is $44 billion, which is more than three times the annual defence expenditure of the Government of India and more than the total military expenditure of most countries other than Japan and China. The USA’s own military expenditure, of course, now amounts to around 47 per cent of the global military expenditure of a trillion US dollars. Neo-liberalism and the surge of capital flight and dirty money Neoliberlism arose as a project of imperialism to counter the increased power of the working classes of the metropolitan countries on the one hand and the Third World countries on the other. Near full employment in the metropolitan countries and social welfare measures had increased the bargaining power of the workers in Europe. An anti- worker ideology was nourished by trashing the achievements of welfare states. Simultaneously, the lessons of history were negated in persuading and bullying Third World countries with semi-feudal social structures to give up those kinds of measures of state patronage and state action which had promoted industrialization in Western Europe and its overseas offshoots. Economic liberalization to comprehend also deregulation of the financial sector became a major weapon in this neoliberal imperialist enterprise. After undergoing centuries of exploitation, most newly independent countries launched programmes of development. From almost the beginning of this enterprise, raucous supporters of the free market system, led by such economists as Peter Bauer and Milton Friedman and followed by Jagdish Bhagwati, Ian Little, Tibor Scitovsky and M. F. Scott (Little, Scitovsky and Scott, 1970) were out to discredit those efforts. But the fact remains that by most indices, the developing countries did far better in respect of economic and human development between 1960 and 1980 than they had done under colonial rule and they have done since the 1980s. Most of these countries had not, however, undergone any social transformation and they were ruled by politicians or military dictators connected to the dominant class of landlords and a nascent capitalist class, which often collaborated with foreign businessmen and governments. So it was relatively easy to ensnare the countries in a debt trap when the easy liquidity provided by the petrodollars of the 1970s became expensive as the US Federal Reserve raised its interest rates after Ronald Reagan came to power. As the businessmen, politicians and top bureaucrats came to read the signs of the impending crisis, they began transferring millions and billions of dollars abroad. The governments borrowed money and they were almost at once transferred abroad by using legal and illegal methods, in a sequence that has been compared to a revolving door. In a capitalist economy public expenditures are often converted into private assets. But in this case the private assets are held abroad on a permanent basis and the growth rate of the economy is damped. The neoliberal order facilitated this robbery by domestic operators or foreign firms with a presence in the developing country in several ways. **First**, the tax rates on the rich were lowered on the fallacious argument that this would lead to higher rates of private saving and investment. **Secondly,** by outlawing controls over business investment, it made the government even less capable of gathering information about these illegal transfers. **Thirdly**, by valorizing business-friendly governments (remember Roberto Campos of Brazil, Tansu Cillar in Turkey, Domingo Cavallo in Argentina and a host of other figures who made a direct transition from the IMF or World Bank to the office of finance or prime minister), it rendered crony capitalism as acceptable normality. Fourthly, by dictating that there should be no public regulation of interest rates, it exposed the whole credit system a victim of unpredictable turbulence. In the context of the USA, this was a major factor behind the Savings & Loans debacle. In the context of Third World countries, it rendered glittering and hollow real estate markets increasingly attractive for lending agencies until foreign investors began behaving like nervous Nellies and brought about the conjoint phenomena of a currency crisis, a banking crisis and a severe downturn of the economy. Fifthly, in a world of footloose and licentious capital, a lot of Third World capital sought to escape to the heaven of the presumed stability of the USA, UK or Switzerland. Moreover, politicians went out of their way to create or bless tax havens (such as Mauritius in the case of India) either deliberately to favour their corrupt constituents or in the fond hope that capital escaping through that route would come back to its home base. One of the chief instruments for enriching the rich and facilitating transfers of public resources to big companies and eventually to transnational corporations was the slogan and policy of privatization. As structural adjustment programmes were imposed on debt- trapped countries and as their currency values went through the floor, they had to sell their public enterprises that had been built up in the 1950s to1970s, or sometimes even from an earlier period.

[We skipped a lot of the card because it was just too long, but we have it here in case u want to look at it. Next sentence is the very last one in the article.]

**The genesis of dirty money is deeply connected with the operation of neoliberal imperialism itself and only a struggle for an alternative global economic order can begin to address the root causes** of their continual outpouring to the detriment of living conditions of the majority of the world’s poor.

#### 4) Credibility – The credibility thesis present in the 1AC rests on the cult of reputation. In reality, the assumptions of credibility theory are patently false

Tang January-March 2005 (Shiping, Associate Research Fellow and Deputy Director of the Center for Regional Security Studies at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences in Beijing, Co-director of the Sino-American Security Dialogue, “Reputation, Cult of Reputation, and International Conflict,” Security Studies, Volume 14, Number 1)

Two implicitly related notions underpin this belief system. The first notion is that one’s reputation is one’s own possession, hence “something worth fighting for.”27 In reality, and as explained above, one’s reputation is not one’s own possession but that of somebody else. The cult thus “puts the problem the wrong way around.”28 The second notion is that reputation is fungible, that reputation gained in one round or place can be transplanted to other rounds or places.29 That is, a cult believer hopes (having previously stood firm) or fears (having previously backed down) that others will perceive his current resolve based on his previous actions. This belief arises from a confusion of behavioral reputation with bargaining reputation, or a belief that behavioral reputation can be easily converted into bargaining reputation. By believing in the fungibility of reputation, the cult puts far too much value on an illusory entity.¶ Furthermore, as a belief system, the cult dictates an “operational code” for state behavior. Consequently, state behavior and rhetoric exhibit a predictable pattern based on the code.30 Two types of behavior and rhetoric follow from the cult’s logic. Type I behaviors and rhetoric justify and take action in the name of defending reputation; type II behaviors and rhetoric justify backing down and limiting the presumed damage to reputation, and to a lesser extent, try to regain reputation after an episode of backing down. (Table 1 details the specific expressions of these two types of behavior and rhetoric.) As demonstrated by recent scholarship, both types of behavior and rhetoric have been rampant, indicating the cult’s prevalence.31 [end page 41]¶ There is, however, a fatal flaw in the cult’s logic, for states rarely act according to the cult’s logic even when the logic should most clearly apply: a state rarely underestimates its adversary’s reputation even if the adversary has backed down in previous standoffs. In other words, although a state constantly fears that others may assign reputation to it based on its past behavior, the state never assigns reputation to other states based on their past behavior. Rivalry has long been recognized as the most intensive type of international conflict and the most likely scenario for reputation to matter.32 The U.S.-Soviet rivalry was the first and perhaps the last true global rivalry in history, and both sides had global commitments. If reputation matters at all, one would expect it to have been paramount in the crisis-bargaining process between these two rivals.33¶ Both Ted Hopf and Daryl Press have examined the role of reputation in the Soviet-U.S. rivalry in great detail, and what they find contradicts the cult’s beliefs.34 In this regard, Press’s examination of the Cuban missile crisis is especially illuminating. As Press noted, if one accepts the logic of the cult of reputation (or the “past action theory”), then by the time of the Cuban missile crisis, the Soviet Union should have lost a great deal of its reputation because Nikita Khrushchev had backed down from three previous ultimatums on Berlin.35 Moreover, the Cuban crisis involved the same two leaders [end page 42; page 43 omitted because it is a graph] (Khrushchev and John F. Kennedy) and thus should have been an ideal case in which to prove the narrower version of the cult.36 The United States should have acted according to the logic of the cult—that is, it should have underestimated the Soviets’ resolve and acted accordingly (for example, by taking an extremely hardline approach).¶ The evidence that Press uncovered deals a devastating blow to the logic of the cult: “the Executive Committee (Ex Comm) was virtually unanimous on a key point: Soviet credibility to resist any of these U.S. approaches was very high.” Perhaps even more extraordinary, there was not even one statement during the entire crisis indicating that U.S. decisionmakers were using Soviet past behavior to predict Soviet actions.37 During the entire cold war, in fact, the Soviets consistently backed down when confronted by the United States. The best it managed was a rough draw at the Berlin Wall. Yet the United States consistently acted as if it did not expect the Soviets to continue to back down. As Robert Jervis put it, “Contrary to American expectations about the inferences others would draw from the American defeat in Vietnam, they themselves did not see further retreats as likely to follow the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan.”38 [end page 44]¶ Likewise, the Soviet Union was reluctant to underestimate U.S. resolve even after repeated U.S. retreats from the Third World.39¶ In a different setting, Jonathan Mercer also uncovered convincing evidence against the logic of the cult. For instance, while Germany backed down in the first Morocco crisis, neither France nor the United Kingdom nor Russia assigned a reputation of irresoluteness to Germany in the next crisis that arose (that in Bosnia-Herzegovina). Likewise, despite the fact that Russia backed down in the Bosnia-Herzegovina crisis, neither Germany nor Austria believed Russia to be irresolute.40¶ Therefore, the only plausible conclusion that we can draw is that although the cult of reputation is prevalent among decisionmakers,41 the cult is just a cult. Although decisionmakers fear that backing down will damage their reputation, they rarely underestimate their adversary’s resolve even if an adversary has (sometimes repeatedly) backed down before. To put it differently, these cult believers rarely act according to the cult’s logic even when the logic should clearly apply; their own actions negate the logic of their belief.

#### Causes threat inflation and shuts down deliberation --- only the alt can solve policy overstretch

Fettweis August 2010 (Christopher J. Fettweis, Assistant Professor of National Security Affairs in the National Security Decision Making Department at the U.S. Naval War College, holds a Ph.D. in International Relations and Comparative Politics from the University of Maryland-College Park, Associate Professor of Political Science at Tulane University, “The Remnants of Honor: Pathology, Credibility and U.S. Foreign Policy”, SSRN)

Hyperbole The credibility imperative often produces rather gaudy hyperbole, or at least underexplained dangers, even in otherwise sober analysts. If the United States were to lose credibility, hawks warn that the floodgates would open to a variety of catastrophes, setting off dominoes that would eventually not only threaten vital interests and make war necessary, but might somehow lead to the end of the republic itself (or to the death of freedom, or to the destruction of civilization, or other horrific disaster). The credibility imperative warns that momentum toward the abyss can begin with the smallest demonstration of irresolution, thus sustaining the vision of an interdependent system where there are no inconsequential events. Snowballs are be easier to stop at the top of the hill, before they have gained momentum.43 Therefore, even tiny slips can begin the United States down the slope toward unmitigated disaster. Once issues are framed in such terms, belligerence becomes understandable. Foreign policy is by necessity a worst-case-scenario business, and decision makers are always wise to hedge against negative outcomes.44 Since a loss of credibility offers a plausible-sounding route to national ruin, it seems logical for policymakers to pay limited costs in the present if by doing so they can avoid unlimited disasters in the future. After all, while incorrect academics face virtually no consequences, missteps by leaders can often be catastrophic. The desire to prevent negative outcomes is prudent; the fear of triggering impossible outcomes is pathological. The credibility imperative inspires decision makers to cross the line between the two time and time again. It never seems necessary to explain precisely how these catastrophes could occur. The mere suggestion that inaction could lead to ruin is often sufficient to shout down those who object to demonstrations of resolution in minor crises. Once leaders internalize the belief that threats are interdependent, it seems to logically follow that the loss of credibility anywhere would be disastrous for U.S. interests everywhere. The costs of tomorrow’s catastrophe will always outweigh those of today’s minor display of resolution. George Ball stood little chance against Robert McNamara. Quemoy and Matsu might not have not seemed to be terribly important to U.S national security in 1955, for example, but if they fell to the Chinese without response the resulting loss of credibility would enable the communists “to begin their objective of driving us out of the western Pacific, right back to Hawaii and even to the United States,” according to John Foster Dulles.45 In 1983, President Reagan told Congress that if the United States failed in Central America, “our credibility would collapse, our alliances would crumble, and the safety of our homeland would be put at jeopardy.”46 Michael Ledeen of the American Enterprise Institute argued that the negotiations with China over the return of the crew during the EP-3A mini-crisis with China in 2001 were “part of an enormously important process, in which the survival of the United States may very well be at stake.”47 Former Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird warned that the stakes in Iraq “could not be higher for the continued existence of our own democracy.”48 The hyperbole produced by the war in Vietnam deserves special mention, since it was in a class by itself. Vice President Johnson worried in 1961 that if South Vietnam were to fall, “the United States must inevitably surrender the Pacific…and pull back our defenses to San Francisco.”49 Secretary of State Dean Rusk wrote that if U.S. commitments became discredited through defeat, “the communist world would draw conclusions that would lead to our ruin and almost certainly to a catastrophic war.”50 As President, Johnson warned his cabinet that “if we run out on Southeast Asia, there will be trouble ahead in every part of the globe – not just in Asia, but in the Middle East and in Europe, in Africa and Latin America. I am convinced that our retreat from this challenge will open the path to World War III.”51 His successor argued that defeat “would spark violence wherever our commitments help maintain the peace – in the Middle East, in Berlin, eventually even in the Western Hemisphere.”52 And Henry Kissinger felt that if South Vietnam were allowed to fall, it would represent a “fundamental threat, over a period of time, to the security of the United States.”53 Somehow “untold millions would be in jeopardy.”54 Audiences often seem distressingly willing to accept projections of catastrophe at face value. Rarely are policymakers or analysts asked to justify these visions, or pressed to examine the logic connecting the present decisions to such catastrophic future consequences. Could interdependence alone set off such enormous strings of disasters? Why should anyone believe that the loss of credibility would result in an unprecedented, unimaginable outcomes? When the United States did not respond belligerently to the seizure of the Pueblo in 1968, Kissinger believed that “we paid for it in many intangible ways, in demoralized friends and emboldened adversaries.”55 No one seemed to ask him in what ways, or which friends, or which adversaries, or if in general one should allow such imprecise, borderline delusional beliefs to drive policy. In this case and others, the shadow of the future blinded the policymakers of the present. During debates, establishing logical connections is never as important as establishing the potential, however slim, for catastrophe. The public is meant to accept these warnings on faith alone, with the understanding that the trusted elite have more experience and expertise in these matters. Few would oppose the defense of Quemoy and Matsu once it was explained that belligerence would prevent a “catastrophic war.” Similarly, it was difficult to argue that aid to the Contras was not in the national interest once it became linked to the survival of NATO and the safety of “our homeland.” Once policymakers internalize the imperative to remain credible, logic and reason can become casualties of fear. It is tempting to doubt the sincerity of those employing hyperbole. It is possible that these decision makers did not really believe what they are saying, and were instead attempting to instill fear in the public for political purposes. Divining the “true motivation” behind the statements and actions of political leaders is a popular cottage industry; it is also necessarily speculative and tendentious. There is little reason to doubt that those under the spell of the credibility imperative mean exactly what they say. After all, it is not only leaders who are guilty – analysts and scholars with little political pressure often reach much the same conclusions. Ultimately, whether statements like these are expressions of actual belief or merely attempts to sell what might be unpopular policies to a skeptical public is not as important as the recognition of the hyperbole, understanding of the origins and minimization of its effects.

#### The affirmative’s approach to the economy assures catastrophic collapse—the economy is too hard for us to understand

**Kroker, 8** Ph.D. in political science and professor of political science at the University of Victoria, director of the Pacific Centre for Technology and Culture and Senior Research Scholar at the University of Victoria (Arthur and Marilouise Kroker, 10/30/8, “City of Transformation Paul Virilio in Obama's America”, http://www.ctheory.net/articles.aspx?id=597#bio)//EM

Are we beyond Speed and Politics? What characterizes contemporary politics is the unstable mixture of speed information and slow movements. Like the slow implosion of the manufacturing economy, the slow rise of evangelical visions of catastrophe, the slow ascent -- the slow ubiquity -- of the speed of technology, the slow descent of culture into the cold state of surveillance under the sign of bio-governance. You can see it everywhere. In the world economy, the speed of mortgage backed securities, credit swap debt offerings, and complex derivatives always seeks to move at the speed of light. Iceland is the world's first country actually liquidated by hyperreality with debts amassed at light-speeds now constituting 10 times its national wealth. Like Michel Serres' the perfect parasite, the Wall Street financial elite has worked a perfect number on the host of the world economies -- implanting unknown levels of toxic debt everywhere in the circulatory system of finance capital, from China and Japan to the European community. Waking up to the danger of hot debt moving at light-speed when it is definitely too late, Japanese bankers suddenly declaim that "It is beyond panic." Wall Street types say it is "panic with a capital P." Harvard economists, standing on the sidelines like a chorus of lament, wisely add that we are now between "capitulation and panic" and "debt is good." That in a world of over-extended economies, sudden loss of financial credibility, and a seizing up of credit mechanisms everywhere, the only thing to do, financially speaking, is wait for the capitulation point -- that fatal moment when despair is so deep, pessimism so locked down tight in the investor's heart, that everything just stops for an instant. No investments, no hope, no circulation. And for the always hopeful financial analysts, this is precisely the point to begin anew, to reinvest, to seize financial redemption from despair. Definitely then, not a speed economy, but a politics and economy of complex recursive loops, trapped in cycles of feedback which no one seems to understand, but with very real, very slow consequences: like vanishing jobs, abandoned health care and trashed communities. In The City of Panic, Virilio writes about the "tyranny of real time," "this accident in time belonging to an event that is the fruit of a technological progress out of political control." For Virilio, we're now interpellated by a complex, three dimensional space-time involved in the acceleration of technological progress "that reduces the extent, the fullness of the world to nothing." Or something else? Not really a fatal oscillation between fast technology and slow society, but hyper-technologies of global financial manipulation that can move so quickly because, just as Jean Baudrillard long ago warned, the hyperreal, simulational world of derivatives, credit swaps, and mortgage backed securities long ago blasted off from material reality, reaching escape velocity, and then orbiting the world as star-like high finance satellites -- purely virtual satellites which have no real meaning for the rest of us as long as they stay in space as part of the alienated, recursive loops of advanced capitalism. But when the meltdown suddenly happens, when that immense weight of over-indebtedness and toxic mortgages and credit derivates plunge back into the gravitational weight of real politics and real economy, we finally know what it is to live within trajectories of the catastrophic. Economists are quoted as saying the financial crisis effects "everyone on earth." Is this Virilio's "global accident?" Quite certainly it is panic finance: that moment when the credit mechanisms necessary for capitalist liquidity slam shut, a time made to measure for Virilio's brilliant theory of bunker archeology, with each bank its own toxic bunker of junk assets, each banker a born again socialist. For example, always vigilant automatic circuit breakers working in the darkness of night recently prevented a global plunge of the futures market. Allan Greenspan throws up his hands, exclaiming "I'm in shocked disbelief."

**Their approach to drug violence sustains the securitized inferno behind the War on Drugs --- frames the “other” as an enemy and enables widespread racism --- causes the worst forms of human rights violations --- also turns the case: their approach destroys necessary cooperation and corruption dooms it to failure**

**Fukumi, 8** (Sayaka, PhD student in International Relations at the University of Nottingham, *Cocaine Trafficking in Latin America*, Ashgate Publishing Company, pg. 106-108, Tashma)

The United States considers cocaine trafficking as a national security threat. This is because it sees cocaine trafficking as a potential harm to the US national economy and moral values, as well as potential support to international terrorism and regional instability. In the United States, cocaine traffi cking is experienced in a combination of direct and indirect harms. Although the supply and consumption of cocaine affect various aspects of national life, the impact of counter-narcotics measures cannot be disregarded. This is because the activities of criminal organisations and law enforcement agencies are, to some extent, inter-related, and the impact of these two different activities are part of the threat posed by cocaine traffi cking. The criminal activities and law enforcement operations, however, affect the state in different ways. Tandy, the chief of the DEA, expresses the threat posed by cocaine traffi cking as: ‘Drug traffi cking organizations attack the soul and fabric of America in pursuit of … money.’189 On the other hand, Reinarman and Levine claim that US drug control policies have caused more damage through racism, poverty and misinformation.190 The impact of the cocaine trade in the United States is more closely linked to the consequences of law enforcement than the nature of trafficking organisations. Although the US government justifi es the signifi cance of strict legislation against cocaine and crack,191 Brownstein maintains that the ‘crack crisis’ and ‘crack epidemic’ were inventions to justify ‘the massive expansion of the criminal justice system and the loosening of restrictions on law enforcement that were central to the justice juggernaut’.192 The US government regards cocaine as a ‘foreign’ enemy to its economy and society due to its origin and the fact that those actively involved in the cocaine trade are likely to be Latin Americans and other ethnic minorities. The large sums of narco-dollars laundered into the US national economy support ethnic minorities and illegal immigrants, allowing them to survive and enrich themselves in the United States. At the same time, the social and economic costs from the increasing number of cocaine addicts are expanding. In the cocaine trade, the United States is losing both financial and human resources. In addition, there is a fear in the US government that narco-dollars can fuel regional instability in Latin America, particularly in Colombia. The terrorist groups in Latin America might be able to expand their activities from the domestic to the international level supported by narco-dollars. Such regional instability will cause damage to the United States both politically and economically. Drug control in general, therefore, is regarded as a policy that alienates some minority groups. The image attached to each drug remains vivid to the Americans: it is believed to be a rampant substance in black and Hispanic communities although the majority of users are white. The cocaine trade is dominated by Hispanic populations because most cocaine is produced in Latin America and distributed through immigrant communities in the United States. The law enforcers, therefore, target particular communities for cocaine arrests, and in doing so, the disregard for human rights has created tension with local communities. As a result, some communities in inner cities are ruled by the cocaine traffickers – the emergence of ‘states within a state’. Law enforcement targeting often depends on profiling such things as ethnicity and the assets of suspects. The law enforcement agencies can earn their operational funding from seizures of assets and arrests of cocaine traffickers. This system of providing seized assets as rewards to the law enforcement agencies spawned injustice and corruption among the agents. Law enforcement officers steal confiscated assets and make illegal arrests and house searches, as well as receiving cash from the traffickers. At the higher levels, investigations are neglected. These cases could be concealed from the public, but when they are exposed, it leads to distrust of the authorities. As a result of the War on Drugs, ‘the entire criminal justice system has been losing credibility’.193 Turning to the diplomatic impact, the United States fears regional instability fuelled by narco-dollars, as well as the massive fl ow of cocaine from Latin America. In order to reduce cocaine production, the United States is actively involved in extradition and bilateral efforts to control cocaine from source countries. The US approach to drug control, however, sometimes disregards the sovereignty of other states and international law. Narcotics Certifi cation can develop negative responses from Latin American states because US foreign narcotics policies towards Latin America have been insensitive to sovereignty issues. This can trigger discord, and make bilateral cooperation difficult, even though Latin American states heavily depend on the United States for economic support. Overall, cocaine traffi cking to the United State has been perceived as a threat, which directly and indirectly affected the economic and public order of its domain. The War on Drugs is supposed to protect America from danger, but ironically, it creates more danger to the society and eventually to the state. Fierce law enforcement practices have brought more violence than the cocaine trade originally did, and restricted the liberty of citizens in the name of protection and justice. Furthermore, aggressive and coercive drug control policy towards Latin America has been making co-operation with other states more difficult.

#### 4) Alt solves – empirics prove

**Munck, 03** - professor of Globalization and Social Exclusion (Ronaldo, Department of Sociology, Social Policy & Social Work Studies and Globalisation and Social Exclusion Unit, University of Liverpool, “Neoliberalism, necessitarianism and alternatives in Latin America: there is no alternative (TINA)?”, Third World Quarterly, Vol 24, No 3, pp 495–511, 2003, http://www-e.uni-magdeburg.de/evans/Journal%20Library/Trade%20and%20Countries/Neoliberalism,%20necessitarianism%20and%20alternatives%20in%20Latin%20America.pdf)//VP

If Argentina shows the downside of neoliberal globalisation at its starkest, we need to consider whether in neighbouring Brazil a more hopeful scenario is not now opening up with the historic victory of the Workers's Party candidate Luis Inacio 'Lula' de Silva in the 2002 presidential elections. In a bold political statement calling for an alternative to neoliberalism, Ciro Gomes and Roberto Unger declared in the mid 1990s that 'Todo o Brasil reclama a falta de proposta e de alternativa' (the whole of Brazil is complaining about the lack of proposals or alternatives) (Gomes & Unger, 1996: 17). But they admitted that, while the people want and need opposition, they have no faith in the opposition that exists. This is, as we shall argue, probably the main issue facing those seeking to articulate a progressive alternative to neoliberalism. Even as advocates and beneficiaries of this perspective/ideology/discourse begin to perceive the seams in this once seamless garment, the people still have confidence in it ('better the devil we know', etc). In this sense, politics is back in command and the ideologues of economic supremacy no longer hold sway over the discursive terrain. The main issues, in terms of the enduring popular credibility of the neoliberal economic project, are the heartfelt need for macroeconomic stability and the spectre of hyperinflation which caused so much devastation in the past.

Unger recognises clearly that what he calls the 'operative version' (my 'really existing') of neoliberalism enjoys a 'unity' that 'is social and political rather than narrowly economic and technical' (Unger, 1998: 58). However, this unity is seen as a negative consensus around disabling the state and disempowering govern- ment. Thus an alternative project to the dominant one of real neoliberalism would need to build a broad political alliance as well as to offer economic policies better able to carry out the productive revolution that the region needs. Raising the level of public and private savings is essential for Unger but, equally, so is the development of institutional arrangements which can channel this into productive investment, not into the global financial casino. To break with the dualism created or exacerbated by globalisation-between those integrated into the circuits of the 'new' capitalism and those who are not-is an economic issue but also, of course, a task of massive social, political and cultural dimensions. The imagination of an alternative may be possible then, but what about its practical implementation? Towards the end of 1997 an influential group of centre-left politicians and intellectuals (led by Unger and Mexico's soon to be elevated to Foreign Minister, Jorge Castanieda) issued the Consenso de Buenos Aires (CBA, 1997) intended as a full-frontal attack on the Washington Consensus. Monetary stability is therein recognised as a sine qua non ('bandera indeclinable'-unfurlable banner) and globalisation is basically taken for granted. From the Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA) structuralist tradition are derived the need for endogenous growth and the truism that growth and welfare are not a zero-sum equation. Much emphasis is placed on the institutional arrangements necessary to achieve social regulation of the market, but then the IDB was also saying at the time that 'Institutions matter', as we saw above. In summary the CBA could be considered a realist social democratic alternative seeking to confront the social exclusionary processes inherent in neoliberal globalisation. It would seem that a reformist alternative to the status quo is possible; whether it is a revolutionary reform in Unger's terms, promoting further transformation, has yet to be seen. In the cities of Brazil controlled by the Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT- Worker's Party) we have seen the germs of a progressive alternative to neo- liberalism. The experience of Porto Alegre's 'participative budget' experiment since l998 has attracted international attention, being dubbed 'an experience of direct democracy without parallel in the world' (Cassen, 1998: 3). In its rigour and breadth this is no cosmetic exercise in 'municipal socialism' and the nearly three-and-a-half million citizens of the urban district of Porto Alegre have come to appreciate its value. There is active popular engagement with budget priorities from education to transport, health to crime, which then feeds in transparently to the actual budget implemented each year. How this experiment in direct democracy meshes (or not) with representative democracy is an open theoretical and practical issue (see Baierle, 2002, for a sceptical view). With a participation rate of 60% the participative budget has certainly engaged the population and it has also, through its transparent mechanisms, proven a strong antidote to the corruption that once permeated local government. At the local level the example of Porto Alegre shows there is a possible alternative to laissez faire economics.

However, many are now asking how the Workers' Party can possibly govern Brazil in the era of neoliberal globalisation and retain any radical principles at the same time. Will Lula not just say the same as Tony Blair did when he assumed office, namely that his 'hands are tied' by globalisation and that the need to maintain Brazil's 'competitiveness' on the world market must take precedence over any social reforms that might be desirable but not practicable? Certainly, the negative example of Argentina loomed large during the electoral campaign with the anti-Lula forces saying that if he was elected, the same would happen in Brazil. Now many on the left are asking whether the Workers' Party will 'live up to its name' and deliver radical policies. From both sides we see misconceptions of what is necessary and possible for a socially progressive political economy in Brazil. The left's critique of Cardoso's government (see for example Rocha, 2002) had already set the tone with unrealistic expectations being placed on progressive presidents. The fact is that Lula must govern having gained 91 (up from 58 in 1998) out of 513 deputies in the National Congress and 10 out of the 54 seats at stake in the Federal Senate. So, from the start the PT is not a hegemonic governing force. The case of Argentina shows the danger of national disintegration as the provinces of that country engage in a 'beggar thy neighbour' strategy in the midst of economic collapse. Brazil will probably display the dangers associated with inflated popular expectations of what can be achieved in terms of socioeconomic reform. As it happens the Workers Party has put forward a rational and progressive economic strategy and I believe this is not only to 'retain investors' confidence' or to 'placate Washington' (although these considerations may not be irrelevant, see Burgos, 2002). The Workers Party government plan recognises that the first challenge is to develop a 'less vulnerable economy' and to regain strong growth rates. It argues for the need to 'create a climate of stability' and to maintain control over inflation. Its first axis of development is the social and the second is 'strengthening the national economy'. Thus poverty eradication, dealing with unemployment and redressing the severe socioeconomic inequalities are placed first. Yet this is only seen as possible with a long-term strategic plan, and state planning is certainly given a key role, one that it never entirely lost in Brazil anyway. Urban regeneration and infrastructure development are seen as key in this regard. But, in explicit contrast to 1950s and 1960s developmentalism (desenvolvimentismo) this national development model is set in the context of improving national 'competi- tiveness' (Pr, Programa de Governo, 2002). Of course there will be many changes to this bold manifesto, and no doubt backtracking, but this seems very much like a 'high road' type strategy and consonant with the Chilean neo- structuralists' call for 'growth with equity' (see Sunkel, 1995). In the Argentinian context Lula's declared intention to prioritise the Mercosur is also highly significant and by no means a minor regionalist gesture.

#### Neoliberal policies are the root cause of violence, oppression, warming, and instability– the price to pay is too high

**Greenberg, 12**, - Ph.D in Anthropology at University of Michigan (James B., Thomas Weaver (Ph.D. in Anthropology at University of California at Berkeley), Anne Browning-Aiken (Ph.D. in Anthropology at University of Arizona), William L. Alexander (Professor of Anthropology at University of Arizona), “The Neoliberal Transformation of Mexico,” *Neoliberalism and Commodity Production in Mexico,* University Press of Colorado, pp 334-335)//SG

Neoliberalism also underlies the growing problems of crime and violence affecting Mexico more broadly. The policies that ruined smallholder agriculture also made the country receptive to growing marijuana and poppies, thereby open- ing spaces into which drug cartels moved (see the chapter by Emanuel and chapter 9 by Weaver, this volume). The money from the drug trade has had a pernicious effect on Mexican society, creating extensive problems of corruption and increas- ing levels of violence (Campbell 2009).Neoliberal policies have driven millions of Mexicans into economic exile and helped turn Mexico into a major source of drugs. Both drugs and victims of structural violence spill across the border, as does the violence that too often accompanies them, reminding us that we live in a global society and thatneoliberalism in Mexico also has direct consequences for the United States.As we have seen with the near collapse of global financial mar- kets, problems are contagious in an increasingly integrated global economy. Just as the consequences of neoliberal policies in Mexico spill over into the United States, the impacts of US applications of neoliberalism reverberate in Mexico. As the popular saying goes, “When the United States catches a cold, Mexico catches pneumonia.” Tight credit affects commodity chains, so the consequences of the neoliberal debacle in US financial markets are felt strongly in Mexico. In sum, our major area of unease regarding neoliberalism is that, as an eco- nomic framework, the lopsided version of development it delivers comes at too high a price.While neoliberalism may further global capitalism’s frantic drive for expansion and increased profit, it has not resolved intra- and inter-nation prob- lems of inequality, environmental degradation, unequal distribution of resources and gains, global warming, lack of healthcare, instability of pension funds, cor- ruption, and clientelism. Instead, it has increased violence and oppression and generally worsened working and living conditions.

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This is not an arbitrary definition

Investopedia No Date (“Invisible Trade”, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/i/invisible-trade.asp)

Definition of 'Invisible Trade ' Business transactions that occur with no exchange of tangible goods. Invisible trade involves the transfer of non-tangible goods and/or services, including customer service, intellectual property and patents. The items involved in invisible trade are associated with a value and can be exchanged for tangible goods. Investopedia explains 'Invisible Trade ' By contrast, visible trade involves the exchange, or the import and export, of tangible goods. Examples of invisible trade include consulting, income from foreign investments, shipping services and tourism. Invisible trade represents an increasing percentage of world trade.

#### Substantial doesn’t solve – either doesn’t solve or limits out the Aff – it means without material qualification

Black’s Law 91[p. 1024]

Substantially - means essentially; without material qualification.

#### It’s arbitrary and undermines research and prep – specifically true in the context of engagement

Resnik, 1– Assistant Professor of Political Science at Yeshiva University (Evan, Journal of International Affairs, “Defining Engagement” v54, n2, political science complete)

In matters of national security, establishing a clear definition of terms is a precondition for effective policymaking. Decisionmakers who invoke critical terms in an erratic, ad hoc fashion risk alienating their constituencies. They also risk exacerbating misperceptions and hostility among those the policies target. Scholars who commit the same error undercut their ability to conduct valuable empirical research. Hence, if scholars and policymakers fail rigorously to define "engagement," they undermine the ability to build an effective foreign policy. The refined definition I propose as a substitute for existing descriptions of engagement is different in two important ways: First, it clarifies the menu of choices available for policymakers by allowing engagement to be distinguished from related approaches such as appeasement, containment and isolation. Second, it lays the groundwork for systematic and objective research on historical cases of engagement in order to discern the conditions under which it can be used effectively. Such research will, in turn, help policymakers acquire the information necessary to better manage the rogue states of the 21st century.